

**EPIC Second Cohort  
2<sup>nd</sup> Advanced Research Workshop**

**Thesis Provisional Title:**

**The Road to Damascus? From Copenhagen to Helsinki:  
Greece's National Preferences and Enlargement**

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**Essex, April 2002**

➤ **Abstract**

This paper looks at one of the main parameters that have contributed substantially to the Greek policy on enlargement. It is argued that understanding the influence of political culture in Greece and the deep rooted cleavage between traditionalist and modernising fractions of society is a basic prerequisite to account for any political development let alone enlargement, which has vital security and economic implications for Greece. The hypothesis that is tested in the dissertation is that the change in political leadership in the PASOK governing party in 1996 is a milestone in the confrontation between the two rival camps and has had important consequences for the Greek position and attitude towards enlargement. This hypothesis is not tested in this paper. What is presented here is the source of this cultural confrontation and its impact on the development of the national identity, state structures and security/ foreign policy considerations.

## **Introduction**

The response of the European Union to the cataclysmic events of 1989 and the collapse of the Cold War European setting was the adoption of a cautious and reactive series of 'policies without strategy' (Zielonka, 1998; Mayhew, 1998a). This resulted to what has been coined as a policy of 'disjointed incrementalism' (Sedelmeier and Wallace, 2000), which can be justified on the grounds of the magnitude of challenges posed to the EU by these fundamental changes in the surrounding political environment. The initial euphoria and the wholehearted rhetoric of the necessity to endorse the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) reflected the relief for the ending of a particularly menacing period in the European history. Feelings of guilt for post World War II abandonment generated a discourse on the moral grounds of the CEECs accession to Western structures (Grabbe and Hughes, 1997). However, the enlargement of the EU could not be based solely on moral arguments. Early on, it was realised that in order for the enlargement process to proceed smoothly, it should provide added value politically and economically to both old and new members as well as the EU as a whole (Michalski and Wallace, 1992; Mayhew, 1998b).

There is no doubt that security considerations helped foster a common understanding among EU member-states as regards the necessity of enlargement. The European security framework was facing a triple challenge, illustrated in the incomplete process of nation-building in the region (Karatan, 1997), a lack of democratic civil society (Kahl, 1997; Gow, 1999) and an increasing economic instability with a great destabilising potential for the rest of the continent. However, whereas overall security concerns were bringing the member-states together, individual aspirations (or at least alleged aspirations) were splitting them apart. A valid argument for a common EU policy intervention in the region was the deep rooted conviction of the CEECs that if left outside Europe, this region would once again provide temptations to its powerful neighbours to play the 'old game' of partition in spheres of influence (Saryusz-Wolski, 1997a). Enlargement was bound to affect the political equilibrium inside EU institutions, shift the political alliances and the centre of interest eastwards, have an impact on the whole integration process and influence the international relationships of the EU. Hence, all countries supported specific candidates in the pre-Luxembourg stage (Lemasson, 1996; Zielonka, 1997; Kahl, 1997). If security concerns brought member-states closer in the early stages of the enlargement negotiations and political considerations drifted them apart, economic considerations created different sets of alliances

and conflicts. Gains from trade have been always difficult to estimate leaving the enlargement debate evolving around the more visible and easily quantifiable budget constraints (Saryusz-Wolski, 1997b; Rollo, 1997, 1995; Faini and Portes, 1995). Hence, the burden on EU policies -especially the CAP, structural and cohesion funds- and the economic consequences of increased migration flows have been dividing member-states (Allen, 1996; Ardy, 1999; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; Baldwin, 1995; Baldwin *et al*, 1997; Hartmann, 1998).

Therefore, the prospect of enlargement raised very important issues for each member-state, bringing forward sometimes conflicting interests and leading to contradicting national attitudes and policies towards enlargement. Hence, it is important to understand whether and how member-states have managed to strike a balance among varying considerations in order to develop a coherent negotiating position throughout the process. In that respect, the encompassing research objective is to understand the process of national policy-making on enlargement and the parameters/factors that have shaped the negotiating position of member-states during the period 1993-1999. Greece constitutes the focus of the study, because this country represents an exemplary case combining vital political and economic 'national interests', which have been at stake in the enlargement process.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The priorities upon which each member-state defined its objectives can be analysed only in single case study country analyses, looking separately for each member-states at the domestic politics and the interplay of the domestic with the international/EU stage of policy conduct. Case studies are better equipped for an in-depth analysis of a complex social or political phenomenon, since they allow the simultaneous investigation of both the phenomenon and the context. They are of extreme usefulness especially when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly defined (Yin, 1994). Indeed, there lies one of the main values of case-study research designs, in the understanding of causal links that are too complex to grasp with alternative research modes of conduct. For many researchers, single case studies lack by definition comparative merit. However, if the research strives to make larger inferences about politics and uses concepts applicable to more than the country under study, then it can be also classified under comparative studies (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). Indeed, the common answer to the criticism that case-studies provide little basis for scientific generalisations is that "...case studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes" and that "...the actual goal of the researcher is to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation)" (Yin, 1994: 10).

The reason why I eschewed a more clear cut comparative research design is the well known trade-off between the level of conceptual abstraction and the scope of countries studied (Mair, 1996). In general, the more countries are intended to be included in a study, the higher the required level of conceptual abstraction of the variables -dependent and independent- to accommodate the many differences among countries and to allow for the political science concepts to 'travel' across different contexts (Landmann, 2000). In a sense, of course, all events and countries are 'unique', but does that mean that explanation can be limited only to the very specific unit of analysis, with no possibility of causal inferences? Thus, the real question raised by the issue of 'uniqueness' is about complexity. All social and political events are embedded into preceding natural and sociological contexts. Viewed historically, every aspect of social reality is infinitely complex. Thus, the answer to the 'uniqueness' issue is whether the key features of the social reality can be disentangled from a mass of

The paper looks at one of the main factors that have influenced the Greek strategic thinking on the EU enlargement, namely the role of the political culture.<sup>2</sup> The main hypothesis that is tested in the dissertation as regards the role of the political culture is that changes in the political leadership of the governing PASOK party in 1996, which signal the gradual silencing of the more traditionalist power fraction within the party, should be accounted for the gradual shift in Greek policy towards enlargement. This paper is not going to proceed to the testing of this hypothesis but will rather concentrate on the presentation and the background of this rivalry between those two political cultures. The paper will start with a short overview of the theoretical framework adopted.

### ➤ **The ‘Two-Level Games’ Theoretical Framework of Analysis**

The significance of enlargement for the future of the EU and the numerous implications for its organisational structure and institutional functioning classify enlargement decisions to the 'history-making' level of decision-making (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). The treaties require re-negotiation and all the policies and initiatives of the EU need to take into consideration the new configuration of membership. Therefore, IR theories seem best able to grasp the multiplicity of the process of enlargement. Different levels of analysis, though, will stress the explanatory significance of different actors. At the *international-systemic level*, it is the state's position in relation to other actors (capabilities and relative power) that will determine the behaviour of the state. At the *domestic level*, analysis

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facts and parameters (King *et al.*, 1994). However, this task of simplification carries within itself the problem of key variable omission bias. That would suggest ignoring a significant parameter despite its explanatory importance. It comes without saying that the more complicated the phenomenon to study, the more dangerous this simplification process can become. That is the reason why case studies seem to me more analytical and covering a greater range of explanatory factors and should be preferred in the context of enlargement.

<sup>2</sup> The thesis is divided into three parts. In the first one, the theoretical framework and the methodological issues are tackled, in the second the main parameters are presented and analysed and finally in the third I am looking closer at three specific case-studies, examining the interplay of these parameters. The material for the third stage is currently being compiled and for reasons of space and time I cannot but focus on one of the main parameters, namely the role of the political culture.

The main argument of the thesis is that three factors in particular are of extreme significance in understanding the Greek case. The first is the long entrenched conflict of political culture between modernising and traditionalist fractions of society and the subsequent political changes in power; the second evolves around national security considerations and the third deals with the role of socio-economic pressure groups, which on enlargement -in the Greek case- have gone along side and not against the other two. Looking at the policy-making process on enlargement reveals the role of each of these parameters, hence constituting the intervening variable in this research project. International pressures complement these domestic factors.

emphasises societal factors, namely the mechanisms of aggregation of individual interests and the political institutions of the polity. Finally, the role of individual statesmen and their personal or psychological characteristics may be also considered as a plausible explanation at an *individual level of analysis*.

All three levels are considered to provide useful insights and should therefore be studied. This is enabled by the ‘two-level games’ theoretical framework (Putnam 1988), which allows the parallel analysis of both domestic and international levels with political leaders performing the role of intermediaries. In the EU environment the role of transnational links between socio-economic groups also has to be considered. Therefore, the analysis will proceed along the lines of (i) *specification of domestic politics*; (ii) *the international negotiating environment*; and (iii) links between those two through the activities of the *national executive* and the *transnational actors*. The main benefit from using this roughly sketched out framework is that it enables consideration of a large range of potential explanatory parameters and supports the exploratory nature of my research venture. It should be stressed that the ‘two-level games’ is a framework and not a strictly defined model. The use of such models is inappropriate for the analysis of complex and multi-dimensional phenomena like enlargement. Hence, the major attraction of this theoretical framework is that it provides an analytical tool and a roadmap of how to proceed with research avoiding rigidity and allowing some space for more exploratory research.

Elaborating more on the analytical parameters of the framework, as regards *domestic politics*, it is essential to define the set of the potential international agreements that is acceptable in the domestic environment; i.e. the ‘win-set’ (Putnam, 1988). The larger the win-set, the more likely is an agreement. The main parameters that define the size and scope of the win-set are the preferences and coalitions of domestic groups (including the executive), their relative position in the domestic institutional structure of the polity, and, finally, the strategies of the national negotiators in the international level. At the international level, the *negotiating environment* is a determinant of the interstate bargaining outcome (Moravcsik, 1999; 1993; 1991). In the case of the EU, the institutional framework and the decision-making rules may be an opportunity for or a constraint on successful negotiating outcomes. As regards enlargement, in specific, the final decision has to be approved by all member-states. In that respect, each member-state has the power to block the whole process, which enhances the leverage of potentially recalcitrant member-states. Hence, unanimity provides

the opportunity to member-states to advocate for their favourable candidate. As regards the role of the *national executives* and the *transnational actors*, this depends on the autonomy that the former enjoys and the organisational efficiency of the latter. Autonomy is a function of the domestic institutional structures, the political leverage of the executive and the power of the agenda-setter in each system. Efficiency is a question of co-operation and influential access to the EU institutional bodies.

Having sketched out the broad outline of the theoretical framework, it is high time to pay a closer look to the deriving hypotheses that frame and guide the analysis. Based on the literature of the impact of economic liberalisation and globalisation on domestic politics, domestic socio-economic groups will adopt a position on enlargement according to the perceived impact on their own prosperity (Milner and Keohane (eds.), 1996). However, their actual contribution is dependent upon their influence on the domestic policy-making process. In other words, the role of socio-economic pressure groups in Greece needs to be evaluated in accordance to the transcending political culture and the model of policy-making. As regards the latter it is important to clarify whether it is institutionalised and provides space and/or opportunities for intervention by organised interests or whether it is based on *ad hoc* individual actions and evolves around political charisma. The logically deriving hypothesis is that wherever personalities prevail over institutions, the role and contributions of the political executive becomes more important than that of organised socio-economic pressure groups. This is particularly the case when socio-economic considerations are competing security ones and especially on cases related to ‘national issues and rights’.

A number of subsequent hypotheses more closely linked to the ‘two-level game’ framework derive from these core hypotheses and frame subsequently the analysis. As far as the preferences of domestic groups are concerned, the degree of homogeneity of the constituency becomes an important factor. The more homogeneous and the more convergent the preferences of the domestic actors are, the more restricted the win-set will be and the more rigid the negotiating stance of the state. This is the case in issues outside the economic sphere, where it is difficult to perceive situations where all the segments are “winners”. But it could well be the case in issues of overall national concern. The politicisation of the issue has also a considerable impact. Whenever activist-interest groups successfully mobilise the mass, the negotiating stance should be expected again to become more rigid. A third element is the distributional balance in the range of the possible win-set outcomes. Costs and benefits

concentrated on specific groups enhance the stake for these groups and their role in shaping the final inventory of win-set solutions. Finally, the intensity of preferences can be influential in allowing or blocking tradeoffs across different issues. These tradeoffs could either change the preferences of the recalcitrant groups or reshape the domestic configuration of coalitions and preferences to enable an expanded win-set and therefore an agreement (Evans, 1993).

As regards the domestic institutional structure, the ratification procedure should be in the foreground, encapsulating the role of social groups in the political stage. Strong dependency on a constituency, which benefits from an international agreement would be expected to lead to its ratification, unless the ‘deprived’ groups have a strong hold on the decision-making process (i.e. veto power). Disproportionate enfranchisement<sup>3</sup> can be, therefore, another important constraint on the size of the win-set. Party affiliation to social groups, partisan political activity and discipline in parliamentary systems must be explored. Of course, the institutional arrangements will also affect the relative autonomy of the statesman as an independent actor. The importance of the latter in shaping the win-set is related to the extent to which (s)he can trace and apply synergistic linkages. In addition, the domestic or international political standing of the political leaders may also turn out to be a catalyst for tipping the balance for or against co-operation.

### ➤ **Political Culture: Traditionalism vs. Modernisation. A Long Entrenched Battle**

In this section, the objective is to present the dichotomous Greek political cultural and track its influence on the contemporary political agenda and rhetoric. The understanding of the political background is a basic prerequisite to the understanding of the Greek attitude before and throughout the period from 1993 to 1999. As it has been very accurately pointed out, in order to “...to understand Greece’s foreign policy orientation, it is essential to examine the forces that shaped her internal and external political identity and as such affected her posture vis-à-vis other states in general and her participation in the European project in

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<sup>3</sup> The term “disproportionate enfranchisement” is used to suggest that a social group has leverage in the political decision-making disproportionate to its actual size and significance.

particular” (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: p.1).

The transformation of a multi-ethnic province of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century into the modern Greek nation-state after the War of Independence was a complex process that has left its marks on the Greek political identity and the Greek *Weltanschauung*. Thus, in order to understand modern developments, it is necessary to be aware of the parallel construction of state structures and national identity, both of which have affected the moulding of a distinct political culture in Greece with its inherent structural deficiencies. In that respect, political culture is regarded as a dynamic characteristic of a whole system, which is constantly negotiated by the continuing and multifaceted interaction between state and society and which permeates every social and political institution as well as individual behavioural attitudes within these institutions.<sup>4</sup> The constituent elements and the forces that have shaped this distinct political culture are products of a specific historical process. Hence, they cannot be fully understood outside their historical context (Wenturis, 1994).

### ***Greek Nationalism and the Construction of National Identity***

Even prior to the establishment of an independent political entity, it is possible to discern two contradicting ideological forces working simultaneously but in divergent trajectories for the construction of a separate national identity. The first was steeped in the Balkan-Ottoman heritage and was profoundly influenced by the universalism of the Orthodox Church, which opposed attempts to bring forward ethnic particularities in the Balkans.<sup>5</sup> The

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<sup>4</sup> Diamandouros (1993a) provides a very coherent overview of the different aspects of political culture and deriving shortcomings for political analysis, making reference among others to Pye, L.W. and Verba, S. (1965) (eds.) *Political Culture and Political Development*; Almond, A.G. and Verba, S. (1965) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in five Nations*; Dittmer, L. (1977) ‘Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis’ *World Politics*, xxix etc. For an anthropological analysis on the Greek case with rich theoretical background on the question of political culture and identity, see Herzfeld, M. (1987) *Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

<sup>5</sup> This is one of the great myths about the nationalistic past of the Ecumenical Orthodox Church, that is the perception that it fanned nationalist movements. On the contrary, in the early stages of ‘national awakening’, or ‘national construction’ -depending on the point of view- in the Balkans, the Patriarchate was actually opposed to such movements, which were seen as eroding its own power and control over the Balkan population. It was only after the emergence of autocephalous Churches -firstly in Greece in 1850 and late in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the other Balkan countries- that the orthodox unity was torn apart by national rivalries and the Church became an instrument to promote political goals and to spread nationalism (Kitromilides, 1997). For a more descriptive account of the role of the Church in the War of Independence and its contribution to the formation of the Greek state structures, see Frazee, C. (1977), *Church and State in Greece* in Koumoulides J.T.A. (ed.) *Greece in*

strongly and occasionally militant anti-Western stance of the clergy, dating back to the age of the schism in the Christendom (1054), together with its accommodation within the Ottoman administrative and political system determined a pronounced introvertedness and a rejection of liberal ideals and principles. At the same time the emerging bourgeoisie inside the empire with its links to the Greek diaspora centres had a far more secular and extrovert orientation and tended to look at the established states in Europe for inspiration and support (Diamandouros, 1993a). It is from this second group and under the strong influence of Romanticism that national awareness and distinctiveness sprang and the call for ‘national awakening’ was orchestrated.

The emergence of an independent Greek state in 1831 signalled a more intensive quest for a national identity that would function as a unifying element among the population and strengthen the legitimacy of the state structures.<sup>6</sup> The construction of an ‘imagined community’<sup>7</sup> was a prerequisite for the harmonious coexistence of the new administrative structures and the pre-existing society and institutions upon which the new structures had to impose their authority. However, the very diverse historical past provided different reference bases for such an identity, enabling the blending of Classical and Byzantine Greece in the pursuit of manifesting the continuity of the ‘nation’ and juxtaposing Hellenic elements against Ottoman oriental ones.<sup>8</sup> Needless to say, of course, that the latter were being constantly demonised in the early Greek historiography as the sources of all evils of the Greek state and society -a trend that is far from extinct even nowadays- whereas the former were being over stressed in order to show this continuity of the ‘nation’ throughout the

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*Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece 1821-1974* (London: Zeno). For a more theoretical discussion of the Orthodox doctrine and its interplay with Greek nationalism, see Lipowatz, T. (1993) ‘Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism: Two Aspects of the Modern Greek Political Culture’ *Greek Political Science Review*, vol. 2, October, pp.31-47 and Oikonomou, E. (1993) ‘Foundations, Doctrine, and Politics of the Eastern Orthodox Church’, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 4:1.

<sup>6</sup> For a short and concise overview -in English- of political developments during the War of Independence and during the first century of political life of the Greek state, see Douglas Dakin (1977) ‘The Formation of the Greek State: Political Developments until 1923’ in Koumoulides J.T.A. (ed.) *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece 1821-1974* (London: Zeno) and Clogg, R. (1979) *A Short History of Modern Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

<sup>7</sup> On an elaboration of the concept, see the highly influential work by Benedict Anderson (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso)

<sup>8</sup> The diversity and heterogeneity of the sources of the Greek identity is one of the features of the Greek political culture that is often misunderstood by outsiders according to James Pettifer. For a discussion, see Pettifer, J. (1996) ‘Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy’ in Featherstone, K. and Ifantis, K. (eds.), *Greece in a Changing Europe: between European integration and Balkan disintegration?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press)

centuries (Papahadjopoulos, 1998).<sup>9</sup> The restoration of the ‘continuity in time’ of the Greek nation manifested by historians like Zampelios (1852) and Paparrigopoulos (1853) was complemented by an attempt to restore ‘continuity in space’ (Veremis, 1997). Thus, the ‘Great Idea’ (‘Megalh Idea’) of liberating all areas with Greek population and making them part of the Greek state came to dominate foreign and domestic policy for the next century providing a national vision and a purpose of existence for the Greek state, leading to the gradual expansion of the state borders.

The ‘Great Idea’ was the epitome of Greek nationalism. Nationalism, however, has had historically a dual role, which is not only to unify a dispersed nation within the territorial boundaries of a state but also to consolidate the state structures and enhance its cohesion. In that respect, the Great Idea and the Greek nationalism in general were fuelled not only by the ambitions for a territorial expansion but equally important also by the necessity to establish internal social and ideological coherence (Kitromilides, 1997). Therefore, the national identity that was initially constructed as a means to facilitate the establishment of the state authorities and enable the popular identification with the regime became the springboard for a conscious nationalistic policy of the Greek state that meant to secure political continuity and survival of the newly created establishment. National irredentism and national liberation struggles, as were prescribed in the ‘Great Idea’ vision, and the continuous turbulence of the hostile neighbourhood, in which the modern Greek state was situated, triggered a series of internal crises and provided enough impetus for the centralisation of the political system (Tsinisizelis, 1996).

As Greece expanded northwards the dilemma about the need to prioritise security threats in foreign policy thinking began, with the realisation of the dual threat to the national security from the north and the east (Veremis, 1995). The Asia Minor campaign of 1919-22 was the apogee of Greek nationalism with military defeat signalling the end of Greek irredentism and the beginning of defensive nationalism. The uprooting following the exchange of population traumatised Greek national consciousness and created a perception of a nation in retreat, a perception strengthened by the continuous wave of retrenchment in the

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<sup>9</sup> This does not suggest, however, that the traits inherited from the Ottoman political and cultural tradition were ostracised from the Greek society. This could not have been done anyway to the extent that these traits had been internalised and had become part of the daily life. This is one of the many paradoxes encountered in Greek culture, namely the demonisation of the Orient without the rejection of the related cultural features.

second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century with Greek communities terminating a centuries-long presence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Egypt and Middle East, Northern Cyprus and lastly Russia and CIS. “These movements have contributed to a sense of insecurity for Greeks in the geopolitical space of the Eastern Mediterranean and have fuelled fear of isolation in the middle of a Slav and Muslim world” (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: p.6). Hence, the emergence of a ‘siege mentality’ has become a critical parameter for the understanding of the Greek foreign policy the last quarter of the twentieth century.

### ***Political and Socio-Economic Institutional Structures of the Greek State***

When referring to the Greek state structures, the first thing to mention is undoubtedly its Ottoman roots. Historically, Greece never experienced the western kind of absolutism with a balanced relationship between monarchy and aristocracy. Instead, the Ottoman rule was very close to the despotic patriarchal structure that Weber called ‘sultanism’. This kind of structure is characterised by the total subordination of the aristocratic caste to a despotic ruler with unbounded and unconstrained power (Mouzelis, 1993). This highly hierarchical structure transcended the whole pyramid of social relations and became gradually identified with high degrees of corruption and nepotism. Thus, paternalistic and clientelistic relations were the main instrument under the Ottoman rule to gain and safeguard tax exemptions and privileges in general. The long socialisation in such an environment and the need of adaptation to this ‘sultanic’ system have contributed to the development of a strongly personalised system of interest representation and the lack of strong societal groups that could face the absolute power of the authority and constrain its actions (Diamandouros, 1993b).

However, both clientelism and the anomalous personalised behaviour which has degenerated into a kind of systemic atypical goal pursuit should not be seen exclusively as ‘...a consequence of the absence of horizontal communications and relations within the Hellenic system and of the veneration of traditional structural patterns to the point of mythicizing them’ (Wenturis, 1994: p.227). They were inherited by the Ottoman rule and they were indeed embedded in the popular consciousness but they were also reproduced or at least survived in the new political and administrative system of the state and were further nurtured by the specific pattern of economic development.

Thus, the introduction of westernised forms of political institutions and the dissolution of the self-administrative apparatus, which had been embedded in the traditional political culture, alienated the population from the formal administration<sup>10</sup> and allowed the pre-existing confrontation between citizens and authority from the years of the Ottoman rule to be transferred to the level of official governmental bureaucracy.<sup>11</sup> As a result of that, people preferred relying more to the long established personalised relations instead of the institutionalised state apparatus. In other words, the main argument has been that the choice of institutional imitation of western origins alien to the local political tradition instead of the adjustment and refinement of the domestic organisational forms contributed to the survival of the pre-existing clientelistic and paternalistic behaviours (Wenturis, 1994).<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the only long-term winners from this situation were the local primates, who realised in time their inability to preserve the decentralised administrative structures and the inevitable centralisation of power and adjusted to the new circumstances by using the opportunities offered by the new organisational and administrative framework to procrastinate their local networks of patronage.<sup>13</sup> Thus, despite the external impression of a modern centralised state,

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<sup>10</sup> For example, in spite of the fact that parliamentary institutions were introduced comparatively early in the Greek political system, these were never fully embraced by the Greek soul and they were seen with the same distrust as the Western liberal ideas in general, see Kioukias, D. (1993) 'Political Ideology in Post-Dictatorial Greece: the Experience of Socialist Dominance', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, vol. 11, pp 51-73. For a discussion of the roots of the distrust towards the western institutional structures, see Diamandouros, N. (1988) 'Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution and Current Trends' in Clogg, R. (ed.) *Greece in the 1980s* (London: Macmillan)

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of the debate and the early attempts during the War of Independence of establishing Western structures and a centralised authority and the reactions by the local primates, see Douglas Dakin (1977) 'The Formation of the Greek State: Political Developments until 1923' in Koumoulides J.T.A. (ed.) *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece 1821-1974* (London: Zeno).

<sup>12</sup> However, Wenturis does not elaborate on how political and institutional structures based on the pre-independence period would manage to tackle these patterns of interaction even if they were adjusted or reformed. The emphasis of his argument is more on the alienating impact of the introduction of completely unfamiliar Western structures to the Greek society of that time.

<sup>13</sup> The main mechanism in that respect was of course the creation of political parties under the direct control of the notables. The first political parties that emerged during the War of Independence were differing only as regards which foreign power was supporting them and became known as the 'French' 'English' and 'Russian' party respectively. In the historical development of parties and the evolution of clientelism into 'party-directed patronage', Mouzelis argues that two sequences can be detected (1987). In the first stage, the very loose structures of the old party system began to give way as the notables started to lose their autonomy and deputies who were directly dependent on the party leader emerged. In the second stage, these deputies' dependence became absolute, paving the way for the total domination of party structures by the occasional charismatic leader. "The overall trend in the Greek polity is not from clientelistic or personalistic to bureaucratic/universalistic party structures – it is rather a movement from the relatively decentralised personalism of the typical clientelistic party to the highly centralised personalism of the typical populist party" (Mouzelis, 1987: pp.279-80). See also Featherstone, K. (1994), 'Political Parties' in Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis,

the state structures resembled more an extensive mechanism for the distribution of prizes among the local primates rather than a mechanism for the achievement of communal objectives (Mouzelis, 1993). To a large extent the political and socio-economic morphology of the Greek structures was still dominated by a basically feudal mentality. The survival of this feudal mentality with its permeability to the state apparatus, the political parties and the economic activities have preserved the pre-existing clientelistic and paternalistic relations as one of the main characteristics of public interaction. Despite partly successful attempts during the Greek transitional periods to modernity to implement changes by politicians like Trikoupis (1880-1895) and Venizelos (1910-1930), who were ardent supporters of state and society modernisation, these characteristics have survived till nowadays.

As regards the pattern of economic development, there is a direct relationship between development and state structures, especially in countries that are latecomers in the development path where the role of centralised authorities is to provide leadership and a roadmap for development (Gerschenkron, 1962). A comparative analysis of countries engaging in late but successful industrialisation would reveal a pattern comprising by a successful modernisation of the agricultural sector, strong links between the primary and secondary sector of economy and a strong state intervention facilitating the former two (Senghaas, 1985). The Greek development plan resulted in a relative failure without bringing about neither the modernisation of the agricultural sector nor the establishment of links and the subsequent revitalisation of industrial production (Mouzelis, 1978).<sup>14</sup> As a result of the limited productive base, a large number of the population was diverted to the services sector, in which the state with its rapidly developing administrative mechanism dominated. Hence, the state instead of generating the necessary conditions for economic growth was seen as an employment alternative without being able to provide any impetus to the revitalisation or

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P.C. (eds.) *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated* (London: Pinder and New York: St Martin's Press) and Papadopoulos, Y. (1989) 'Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity within Change', *West European Politics*, vol. 12

<sup>14</sup> For an elaborated discussion of the development of the agricultural sector, see Vergopoulos, C. (1977) *To Agrotikon Zhthma sthn Ellada: H Koinonikh Ensomatosh ths Georgias [The Agricultural Issue in Greece: the Social Integration of Agriculture]* (Athens: Eksantas) and the academic discussion between Mouzelis and Vergopoulos in the *Journal of Peasant Studies* from 1976 to 1979. For a more recent reappraisal of the same issue, see Maraveyas, N. (1992) *Agrotikh Politikh kai Oikonomikh Anaptyksh sthn Ellada [Agricultural Policy and Economic Development in Greece]* (Athens: Nea Synora). As regards the early development stage of the Greek industrial sector, see Dertilis, G. (1984) *H Ellhnikh Oikonomia kai h Biomhxanikh Epanastash: 1830-1910 [The Greek Economy and the Industrial Revolution: 1830-1910]* (Athens: Sakkoulas).

restructuring of the production structures. Because of the strong grip on the state by the mainly populist political parties consisted of local primates with the internal logic of existence and function described earlier, the state apparatus became an instrument of distribution of spoils and privileges serving and reproducing the clientelistic and paternalistic relations.

Bringing together the three factors analysed above, namely the historical tradition of clientelistic relations from the Ottoman period, the negative disposition of the population towards the imposed alien institutional structures and the failure of the state to generate changes in the economic structures, it is easy to understand the survival of these modes of societal and state interaction. The logically deriving result is the emergence of a social and political space characterised by the absence of a clear demarcation between the state and society in Greece (Wentouris, 1994). In the same line of thought, the prevalence of the clientelistic pattern of relations and the over centralisation of power as a result of the external environment explain to a large extent how the modern Greek state has developed as both omnipresent and at the same time fundamentally weak (Tsoukalis, 2000) or in other words ‘a colossus with feet of clay’ (Sotiropoulos, 1993).<sup>15</sup>

### ***‘Refusal Ideology’, ‘Conspiracy Syndrome’ and Foreign Intervention: Squaring the Circle***

During the ‘national awakening’ stage, emphasis was laid upon establishing the continuity of the nation and claiming the rights of inheritance of the glorious past. This process continued during the early years of the newly found independent state, as it has been mentioned, to promote social cohesion and state legitimacy. As a result of this conscious policy, there was a stress of the past achievements of the Antiquity or of the period of the Byzantine empire, periods during which the Greeks had efficiently attained a leading role in the spheres of culture, politics and economics and a resulting downplaying of the current state of development of the Greek state and society. Thus, an imaginary world was put forward in the communal sub-consciousness where Greece played a central role in

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<sup>15</sup> The most comprehensive work depicting the interaction between state and society remains Tsoukalas, C. (1983) *Koinonikh Anaptyksh kai to Kratos [Social Development and the State]* (Athens: Themelio) and idem. (1986) *Kratos, Koinonia, Ergasia [State, Society, Employment]* (Athens: Themelio). As regards the economic (under) development in Greece and the role of/ impact on the state, see Mouzelis, N. (1978) *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment* (London: Macmillan).

international developments far disproportionate to her actual powers and capabilities. The inability to separate the glorious past from the realities of the current situation brought about a state of affairs where socio-political dynamics were unable to differentiate myth from reality (Wenturis, 1994: p.227).<sup>16</sup> For example, the support received during and after the War of Independence was considered by the Greek side as a moral debt of the ‘civilised’ Western world to the ‘cradle of civilisation’. Once independence was gained, this imaginary led to great expectations as regards the position of Greece in the European constellation of powers.

Hence, upon the sudden realisation of Greece’s role as another pawn in the European power game, this characteristic led to severe disappointments and frustrations, which in turn led to distrust about the foreign element and became a permanent feature in the Greek psyche. Thus, in considerable stages of the development of the newly found Greek state and polity, a policy of ‘splendid isolation’ came to be adopted and a subsequent ‘refusal ideology’ against anything or anyone not abiding to the ‘greatness’ of the Greek nation (ibid. p.227). The Greek uniqueness<sup>17</sup> has been enough to legitimise the ‘national rights’, which were -and still are- considered to be so manifest that the only reason why foreign powers do not support them has been their participation in a conspiracy to deprive Greece from her position in the pantheon of great nations.

This distrust towards the foreign element was further accentuated by the interventions of the Great Powers in the domestic political stage throughout the history of the modern Greek state. Being situated at a geo-strategically important position, Greece was a significant player in the ‘Eastern question’ of the dissolution of the declining Ottoman Empire and later in the European power games and the Cold War. Thus, foreign interventions in the political stage even from the period during the War of Independence and the manipulation of both domestic and foreign policy led to an ever increasing dependency from the protecting powers -be it England, France, Russia or more recently USA (Woodhouse, 1977). This has “...left a

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<sup>16</sup>This trend was considerably fanned by the resurgent intellectual currents of Romanticism and Neo-classicism. The emerging group of Philhellenes, inspired by the readings of classical writers and philosophers, supported the Greek War of Independence only to be disillusioned by the conditions they encountered.

<sup>17</sup> After all according to a former President of the Hellenic Republic (1985-90), Christos Sartzetakis, Greeks are ‘a brotherless nation’.

pervasive legacy and shaped a deep-seated syndrome of protection-seeking, even though ‘protection’ is condemned as a deleterious phenomenon ending up leading to unacceptable [further] interventions in domestic politics” (Ioakimidis, 1996: p.47). Thus, great powers’ interventions came to be considered responsible for all the catastrophic moments in the modern Greek history from the failure of the Minor Asia campaign (1921-22) to the Civil War (1946-49), the *junta* regime (1967-74) and the tragedy in Cyprus (1974). Foreign intervention and ‘protection-seeking’ became interwoven in the political development of Greece both in a real and an imaginary sense.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Political Culture: Traditionalism vs. Modernisation***

The characteristics of the Greek political and social space presented so far indicate that the social, political and cultural struggles that took place throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century in order to control the rise of Greek nationalism and the construction of the modern state in the country have given rise to two conflicting political cultures. These two cultures pre-existed the formation of the Greek state but were crystallised in the course of the following decades. Over time these rival cultures became a central and permanent feature of society and have affected the country’s political development down to the present. “The distinctive feature of both of the cultures is that they often cut across society and are not exclusively identified with a specific political party. This has greatly undermined the capacity of the political parties to serve as effective mechanisms of interest-aggregation and has decisively contributed to the historic incapacity of both cultures to render permanent their temporary ascendancy” (Diamandouros, 1993a: p.2).

The older of the two cultures reflects the historical realities of the Greek case. What Diamandouros coined as the culture of the ‘underdog’, is characterised by a distaste and fear of the modern organisational principles of society, the capitalistic market organisation outside state regulation, societal rationalisation and secularisation and the institutional mediation in the relations of the individual with the state. This is a culture based on a xenophobic view of the world inspired by the traumatic experiences of foreign intervention and dependency. As a

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<sup>18</sup> Note in that respect the then Prime Minister C. Karamanlis’ statement in the daily *Kathimerini* that “entry into the EEC could first and foremost free Greece from all forms of foreign interventions and dependencies” (11.04.1978).

result it has adopted and cultivated the conspiratorial interpretations of developments, the mentality of the nation being under siege and a manichean division of the world into ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ (Diamandouros, 1993a, 1993b; Fatouros, 1993). On the other hand, the younger of the two cultures draws its intellectual origins from the Enlightenment and from the tradition of political liberalism deriving from it. It is far more secular and extrovert in orientation and it has been linked over the years with attempts of reforming the society, economy or polity towards rationalisation along liberal, democratic and capitalist lines. More outward looking and less parochial than its rival, it has tended to encourage the creation and proliferation of international links and to promote Greece’s integration in the international system (Diamandouros, 1993a, 1993b; Fatouros, 1993).

The historical trajectory of the Greek state has been deeply affected by the clash between these two competing ideologies. To put it schematically, the modernisation<sup>19</sup> forces were the predominant cultural element in the Greek world from the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century up to mid-1930s. From then on and until the end of the colonels authoritarian regime in 1974, they entered a period of gradual decline following the uprooting of the diaspora communities and the exhaustion of the momentum generated by the Venizelist modernising political programme, both of which had for a long time been the frontrunners of this culture. The deep societal divisions following the National Schism between the Republican and Royalist camps (1916-36) and the traumas of the Civil War proliferated foreign interventions and personalised forms of social interaction. As a result, during the same period, the ‘underdog’ culture experienced a growing ascendancy in politics.

In conclusion, without mystifying the argument about the Greek peculiarity, the underlying assumption is that especially in Greece political culture is an indispensable and crucial parameter for the understanding of any political developments. Thus, the analysis in this paper has focused on the complex and heterogeneous base of the Greek national identity and how it has been used for the consolidation of the state structures. It has also dealt with the interaction between state and society, highlighting the omnipresent but very weak role of

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<sup>19</sup> ‘Modernisation’ as a term has a political connotation in the Greek political environment as it has been related to the political fraction within the PASOK political party, led by the current Prime Minister Constantine Simitis, that gained control of the party and the government in the leadership struggle following A. Papandreou’s death in 1996. Hence, it should be clarified that the use of inverted commas intends to indicate these specific political developments whereas the term without the inverted commas is used in its literal meaning.

the state and the prevalence of clientelistic and paternalistic patterns in individual behaviours and institutional functions. Furthermore, it has portrayed some widespread beliefs affecting the international relations of the country. Finally, bringing all these features together, it has presented the two completely contradictory political cultures that have emerged over the almost two centuries of independent political life.

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