

**Ethnic parliamentary incorporation in Central and Eastern
Europe: finding a mechanical explanation**

**Paper to be presented at the 4th Annual Graduate Student Retreat of the Society for
Comparative Research.**

Budapest, May 8th - May 10th

Rubén Ruiz Rufino

C/Castelló, 77

28006 Madrid

Spain

Email: Rruiz@ceacs.march.es

Introduction

The study of the electoral system as a dependent variable has not been a very common subject in the writings of political scientists. Furthermore, all the existing studies focusing on this issue have treated the question as trying to identify the causes and mechanisms that have explained changes from majoritarian to proportional representation systems. The questions, as Lijphart points out, are: what are the causes of choosing different electoral systems? Why, for instance, do some countries use plurality formulas and others PR? (Lijphart 1985:3) The answers for these questions have been varied. So, for Rogowski, proportional representation systems will be found more likely in closed trade-dependent countries because when experiencing strong pressures for democratic participation, the institutions created by a PR system will grant a higher insulation, autonomy and stability (Rogowski 1987:212). Rokkan observed different mechanisms. On the one hand, PR was adopted in plural societies where social heterogeneity was very significant because PR institutions provided minorities with mechanisms to participate in public life. On the other hand, Rokkan observed that the abandonment of majoritarian formulas was caused by the incorporation of universal suffrage in society. Under this scenario, the elites of old-parties saw their hegemonic position threatened and opted for PR systems (Rokkan 1970) A similar argument was also used by Boix to explain the change of the electoral system. The mechanisms that explain the adoption of PR systems are based upon the calculus that governing elites make in order to preserve as much as possible their power (Boix 1999)

The study of the electoral system can be extended beyond the discussion presented above. Given that electoral systems provide citizens with the necessary tools and devices to organise democracy, another set of questions can be formulated. Why do some countries facilitate political representation to specific sectors of their society? What are the incentives that these countries have to discriminate in favour of special groups that can be found in societies? The issue here is not to explain why a country decide to adopt a majoritarian or a proportional representation electoral system. The question is why given countries with similar electoral systems and ethnic distribution, some of them decide to ease political representation and why others do not. The puzzle is particularly relevant in Central and

Eastern European countries. This region is of special importance, at least, for two reasons. Firstly, because they are countries that can be classified as new democracies and still today are undertaking a process of institutional design. Secondly, because they are countries clearly marked by ethnic cleavages.

The purpose of this paper is to show some preliminary evidence based on different sources that shows how in these countries we can find different patterns concerning the relationship between parliamentary representation and ethnic minority groups. It will also try to provide the reader with possible mechanisms that could explain these differences.

I.

As Adam Przeworski points out, democracy can be understood as a system where some political parties may lose elections (Przeworski 1991) This definition of democracy is not an extensive one and basically links democracy with elections. Political parties and elections are the most important elements when defining democracy. If so, it is plausible to say that those mechanisms that regulate parties and elections are also key for democracy. In this sense, an electoral system can be defined as a “set of laws and party rules that regulate competition between and within parties” (Cox 1997:38) It can also be understood as “the set of methods for translating the citizen’s votes into representatives seats” (Lijphart 1994: 1) The importance of the electoral system for democracy lies, then, in its capacity to reflect society into the decision-making bodies of any democracy. In highly divided societies the design of the electoral system is an interesting issue to look at for the resulting institutions will show how that heterogeneity is reflected in the legislative bodies. The reasons why we can find different patterns of political representation for ethnic minorities in highly divided societies is the main issue of my dissertation.

In a general sense, the concept of minority, ethnic or national, refers to: a) a distinct group numerically smaller than the rest of a state’s population and occupying a sub-dominant position; b) the members of this group, nationals of the state in question, differ from the majority by their language, culture, ethnic affiliation or religion (Benoit-Rohmer and Hardeman 1994:91) In a more constrained sense, Gurr offers a concept of minority based on two criteria: a) *The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a state* (Gurr 1993:6) and b) *the group was the focus of political mobilization and action in defence of promotion of its self-defined interests at some time between 1945 and 1989* (Gurr 1993:7) I think both definitions are valid for the purpose of my research. A key feature of all Central and Eastern European countries is that they are formed by a mixture of different groups. The incorporation of these minorities into public life is treated differently. Only a few constitutions grant members of national minorities the right to take part in public affairs: Art.25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms-embodied in the Constitution of the Czech Republic;

Art.34 of the Slovak Constitution; and Art.64 of the Slovenian Constitution. Other forms such as the right to “collective participation in public life” or “representation of the national and ethnic minorities living within the territory of the country” are just limited to Art 68 paras.2 and 3 of the Hungarian constitution. Furthermore, as Benoit-Rohmer and Hardeman explain “in the minds of the drafters of the Constitution, recognition of such rights entails no obligation whatsoever to ensure the parliamentary representation of minorities. In their view, such rights could be quite adequately realised simply by giving minorities a say in the management of local affairs (as is the case in most states which have established such rights), or by a process of consultation to any decision at national level (as is the case of Hungary)” (Benoit-Rohmer and Hardeman 1994:94)

Why do some countries guarantee or facilitate participation in public life and others do not? This question can even be more puzzling when legislation about parliamentary representation is taken into consideration. To show this, I will provide evidence taken from the main constitutional texts of almost all countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Concretely, I have been working on constitutions, elections laws and political parties-public associations- laws. In order to make clearer my argument, I will classify all countries in four categories following the distinction created by Flores Juberías (Flores Juberías 1999) Firstly, there are some countries that are completely opposed to the representation of ethnic minorities at least in a formal way. The two cases where the legislation expressly forbids the creation of political parties based on ethnic grounds are Albania and Bulgaria.

In the 1990 Electoral law that was used to regulate the first democratic elections after the fall of communism all kind of organizations –trade unions or civic associations-were allowed to nominate candidates for the parliament. This benefited *Omania*, the associations defending the interests of the Greek community in Albania, which in the 1991 elections got 0.7% of the votes and 5 seats in the Parliament. The panorama changed drastically in the 1992 Electoral law (Law No.7556) Under this law, the only electoral “subjects” who have the right to field candidates are parties, a group of parties or an individual who presents his or her own candidacy in an electoral district (Art.12) Therefore, an individual who presents his or her own candidacy is considered an electoral subject, but no organization may take

part in the elections, unless it is a political party. This provision provoked a severe reaction in “Omania” because this group was thereby prohibited from taking part in the elections. The “Omania” organization was unable to attain the status of a political party because the law “On Political Parties” (Law No.7502 dated July 25,1991) outlawed the “formation of parties on religious, ethnic and regional bases.” Because of the international pressure, the problem was resolved, however, when the minister of justice registered the *Party for the Defense of Human Rights* (PBDNJ) which in practice consisted of members of the Greek minority as an independent party. To camouflage its ethnic character somewhat, Albanians were also admitted into its ranks.

The case of Bulgaria is very similar. In this country Art.11 para.4 of the Constitution adopted in 1991 states that “ there shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial, or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent usurpation of state power” and Art.12 para. 2 of the same legal text “Citizen’s associations, including the trade unions, shall not pursue any political objectives, nor shall they engage in any political activity which is the domain of the political parties” These two articles are complemented by Art 3. para.2.1 that says “A political party may not be established when it is based on a confessional or an ethnic principle or purports to fan up racial, national, ethnic and religious enmity.” These legal dispositions were an attack against all possible parliamentary representation of any of the ethnic groups existing in Bulgaria but mainly against the Turkish minority. However, and similar to Albania, there exists a political party that defends the interests of this minority, the *Movement for Rights and Freedom* (DPS) Although this political party can be considered as an exception in the Bulgarian legislation the case is that the Turks have been participating in the parliament since the first democratic elections and have even been part of the governing coalition. The question, then, is to which extent these dispositions are effective. Are these countries truly rejecting minority representation? It is true that in Albania and Bulgaria there exist groups other than Greeks and Turks and that at least in the Bulgarian case, no other minority party has been allowed. But the question above is interesting since it refers to the most important majorities in these countries. It is not totally implausible to say that in practice these countries do allow at least partially ethnic representation in parliament.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyztan are also countries that ban in their legislation the creation of parties but only based on religious grounds. Banning the creation of political parties on religious grounds can also be understood as an impediment for minorities to get political representation. Art 5 para. 4 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan says that “in the Republic, operation of the political parties and trade unions of other states, religiously grounded political parties, and the financing of political parties and trade unions by foreign legal persons, citizens, and states, and international organizations are all prohibited”. Similarly, Art.8 para.4 of the Constitution of Kyrgyztan “The following shall not be allowed in the Kyrgyz Republic: ...formation of political parties on religious grounds. Religious organizations must not pursue political goals and objectives.”

The opposite category of this classification refers to those countries where the legislation not only grants the formation of political parties based on ethnic grounds but also grants a seat in parliament in case that those parties do not reach the legal threshold to get representation. The countries under this category are Romania and Slovenia. In Romania, Art.59 para.2 of the Constitution establishes that “Organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, which fail to obtain the number of votes for representation in Parliament, have the right to one Deputy seat each, under the terms of the electoral law.” This article must be read together with Art.4 of the Law on the Election to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate enacted in 1992. Under the Romanian legislation, then, organisations representing the interests of minorities will always have at least one seat in parliament.

Similar legislation can be found in Slovenia. In this country, Art.80 of the Constitution adopted in 1991 establishes in its paragraph 3 that “the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities shall always be entitled to elect one deputy each to the National Assembly” This same idea is collected in Art.2 of the Law on the Election of the Chamber of the State 1992. In this piece of legislation mentions to Hungarian and Italian minorities are also collected in Arts. 3; 8; 20; 32; 36; 57; 61; 80 and 81. In these articles it is regulated the special status granted to these communities. The case of Slovenia is an interesting one, not just because it grants a seat to ethnic minority groups when most of the countries do not

but because it grants this special status to two of the less significant minorities in the country. The ethnic composition of Slovenia is made up of 88% Slovenes, 3% Croats, 2% Serbs, 1% Bosniaks, 0.6% Yugoslavs, 0.4% Hungarians, 0.16% Italians and 5.1% of other groups. Taking Hungarians and Italians together they represent less than the fourth minority in Slovenia –Bosniaks. This fact makes me be quite cautious about this particular case. Why does the Slovene legislation grant a seat only to these groups and not to all like in Romania?

The third category refers to countries that are at an intermediate level. They are characterised by some kind of approach between slightly recognising the existence of ethnic groups and favouring their parliamentary representation. Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia are the countries that better fit this distinction. Here we find countries that only recognise the right for minorities to create their own political parties. Examples are Croatia and Slovakia. In Croatia, Art.43 para.1 of the Constitution adopted in December 1990 establishes that “Citizens are guaranteed the right to free association for the purpose of protection of their interests or promotion of social, economic, political, national, cultural, and other convictions and objectives. For this purpose, citizens may freely form political parties, trade unions, and other associations, join them, or leave them.” In Slovakia, Art. 34 para.1 says that “the comprehensive development of citizens representing national minorities or ethnic groups in the Slovak Republic is guaranteed, particularly the right to develop their own culture, together with other members of the minority or ethnic group, the right to disseminate and receive information in their mother tongue, the right to associate in national minority associations, and the right to set up and maintain educational and cultural institutions.”

The Czech Republic allows the minorities to participate in public life although in a very vague way. So, for instance, as I mentioned above Art. 25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms allows minorities “the right to participate in the settlement of matters concerning the national and ethnic minorities”. But we find no other mention whatsoever referred to ethnic minorities in any of the pieces of legislation settling the electoral system.

The rest of the countries, that is, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland have in their legislation dispositions that facilitate in several degrees the incorporation of minorities into parliamentary representation. So, for example, Arts. 3; 4; 5 ; 109 and 110 of the 1993 law on the election of the Sejm in Poland establish some mechanisms where the legal threshold to get parliamentary representation is lowered for the case of organisations of national minorities. In Lithuania the legislation is a bit clearer. The Constitution adopted in 1992 states clearly in Art.45 that “The State shall support ethnic communities” and art. 76 para1 of the 1992 “Law on Elections to the Seimas” establishes a mechanism to provide minorities with a parliamentary mandate. But where the legislation is more developed for the case of ethnic minorities is in Hungary. In the constitution of this country adopted in 1949 it is established in Art.68 para.2 that “The Republic of Hungary shall provide for the protection of national and ethnic minorities and ensure their collective participation in public affairs...” and in para.3 “The laws of the Republic of Hungary shall ensure representation for the national and ethnic minorities living within the country.” These disposition are further developed in all the special legislation that Hungary has for ethnic minorities. Although Hungarian legislation does not grant representation in the same way that Romania or Slovakia, it favours the incorporation of minorities into the decision-making process of the country.

The last category of this classification refers to those countries that completely ignore the existence of ethnic minorities. One reason to do that can be the principle of equality before the law and the principle of no discrimination on ethnic or national grounds. This is the case of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine. A common feature in all these countries that can be found in their legislation is that their constitutions do not refer to any minority issue. Art. 25 of the Armenian constitution –but also Art. 26 of the Georgian Constitution- is very clarifying in this respect: “Everyone has the right to form associations with other persons, including the right to form or join trade unions. Every citizen is entitled to form political parties with other citizens and join such parties. These rights may be restricted for persons belonging to the armed forces and law enforcement organizations. No one shall be forced to join a political party or association”. The writing of this article, which can be found in other legal texts of

countries under this category, says nothing about the minorities living in these countries even though they are numerous. The only kind of clauses that can be found referring to ethnic issues are those forbidding the creation of political parties which aim is to promote ethnic or racial hatred –Art. 5 of the Constitution of Belarus, Art.26 para. 3 of the Georgia Constitution.

After this brief review of the main pieces of constitutional legislation, we observe how the participation of ethnic minorities in parliament is different and can even be graded. But, the evidence presented in the previous section should be read very carefully. Firstly, because it is not exhaustive. One important features of electoral systems in Central and Eastern Europe is their changing nature. In almost all countries, legislation, except constitutions, has been changing from one election to another. In some cases the changes have been very serious –in Bulgaria the electoral system has changed from majoritarian to PR as well as in Poland- and in some other cases it just has been about minor, though not less important, ones –size of circumscriptions like in the case of Moldova. The legislation revised here has tried to cope with the most important changes but there is still a big amount of legislation to be revised in order to get a clearer spectrum of the situation of minorities in these countries. Secondly, I am not very convinced by the evidence that shows that certain political parties are banned. Concretely, the cases of Albania and Bulgaria which seem to be paramount for one of the categories of the classification, are not very convincing since in fact, minorities parties do have representation in the parliament of these countries. All this indicates that I need to inquire further if I wish to get a clearer idea about the reasons behind the existence or non-existence of ethnic political representation in these countries. I will do that in the following sections.

II.

So far in the paper, I have covered all countries from Central and Eastern Europe. However, since the purpose of my dissertation is to find out why ethnic political parties get representation the sample of countries will be reduced. The criterion to reduce the number of countries under study is the high number of independent candidates that exist in certain Republics. In countries like Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan political representation is not as much organised around political parties as around independent candidates. For this reason, I will remove these countries from my study. This leaves the sample for my research with fifteen countries: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The unit of analysis for my research will not be the country, though, but every parliamentary election. This unit of analysis has already been used in other works (Lijphart 1994) and can be justified precisely by the changing nature that electoral systems have in these countries.

As I said in the previous section, it seems that a look at the constitutional legislation does not provide a fully convincing answer to the question of my research. Other variables like the geographic dispersion of ethnic minority groups or the existence of some degree of collective action by such groups can provide more light to the issue at stake. In this sense, it seems plausible to think that some of the necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to get ethnic parliamentary representation are related to these three variables. Parliamentary representation of ethnic minority groups will be found more easily in those countries where the electoral law recognises the existence of ethnic minorities as well as it is sympathetic with the purpose of facilitating that kind of representation. Another necessary condition is that ethnic minority groups are mainly concentrated in one region and not dispersed all around the country. And thirdly, ethnic minority groups are organised collectively. They exercise collective actions in order to pursue a better treatment by the state that may facilitate parliamentary representation.

Having said all this and before proceeding to the analysis of the variables suggested above I would like to show the relationship between legislation and ethnic parliamentary representation. This information is shown in the following cross-tab.

Table.- 1

Existence of Ethnic Representation in Parliaments	Legal Situation of Ethnic groups concerning political representation				Total
	Opposed to existence of parties	Ignorance of Minorities	Recognition of Minorities	Granting of Parliamentary Seats	
No Existence	0	14	9	4	27
Existence	10	5	8	4	27
Total	10	19	17	8	54
Pearson Chi2	14.3220***				
Cramer's V	0.515				

*** Significat at $p < 0.01$

Table 1 shows something that I pointed out in the previous section: the little importance of legislation to explain the presence in parliament of ethnic representatives. Those countries that are more fiercely opposed to the creation of political parties based on ethnic or religious grounds, Bulgaria and Albania, do have in fact members of parliament belonging to ethnically based political parties. In any of the five parliamentary elections both in Albania and Bulgaria, Greeks and Turks respectively have won enough seats to even be a key group in the cabinet formation. On the other hand, one of the countries that do grant a limited number of seats in parliament, Slovenia, does not have any ethnic political party in parliament. Furthermore, the fact of having legislation sympathetic to minorities and recognising their value and promoting their political incorporation has very little effect. What seems to be more logical is the pattern found in those countries that do ignore the existence of ethnic minorities. With the exception of Macedonia, the rest of the countries do not have any political group defending ethnic minorities in their chambers. The two variables are associated as Cramer's V shows. The association is not very strong though, the higher value of Cramer's V is 1, but it is significant at 0.01. However, we cannot conclude from this that a causal relationship exists between these two variables and what is the direction of the relationship. I will provide with this information in the following section.

Legislation is not enough then to explain the existence of ethnic parliamentary representation. As I said above, it is necessary to look at other variables to get a clearer picture. In this sense, it can be plausible to see as necessary conditions to find political representation the existence of collective action within the group and how they are dispersed geographically. Let us consider firstly the issue of collective action. It can be logical to think that those ethnic minority groups that exercise collective action are more likely to get a seat in parliament than those groups where there is not any type of organisation. Given the preliminary nature of this pages, I have decided to concentrate only in the largest minority group of every country. For the purpose of this paper I have used a variable from the Minority at Risk database. This variable, *Protest*, has five categories that summarise different degrees of protest. I have not used the individual value of the index for the year of the election. I have considered that collective action is important before and after the election. For this reason, I have used two aggregated indexes. For those elections that took place before 1995, I have used the variable *Protest90x* which measures the level of protest from 1990 to 1995. For those elections between 1995 and 1998, I have used the variable *Protest98x*. Furthermore, for the purpose of my research, I have recoded the values of this variable into a dummy. Values 1 to 3 will be recoded as 0 and it will indicate the inexistence of collective action. These values vary from verbal opposition –1- to small demonstrations –3- passing through symbolic resistance –2-. Since these activities are performed by a minority within the group, I will not consider them as examples of collective action. My concept of collective action, then, is a very narrow one and refers only to considerable demonstrations by a considerable bulk of the group. Value 1 of this dummy variable comprehends then values 4 – medium demonstrations- and 5 –large demonstrations- of variable *protest* from MAR. From this data we get the following table.

Table.- 2

Existence of ethnic representation in parliament	Collective Action Dummy		Total
	No collective Action	Existence of Collective Action	
No existence	14	6	20
Existence	11	6	17
Total	25	12	37
Pearson Chi2	0.1175		
Cramer's V	0.0564		

The first thing that we observe in this table is the little association between the two variables. This is shown by Cramer's V that it has a value of 0.0564. Remember that when Cramer's V has a value of 0 it indicates that there is no association between the two variables in the cross-tab. It is also important to remark that the variable is not statistically significant. More substantively, the table shows no pattern or confirmation of the hypothesis developed above. The fact of exercising collective action have ambiguous results concerning ethnic representation in parliament. It seems that it does not matter very much to be organised and exercised collective action if political representation is pursued.

Geographical dispersion of the ethnic minority group can throw more light into this issue. It can be thought that a necessary condition to get political representation in parliament is that ethnic minority groups are concentrated and not dispersed. The variable *Groupcon* from Gurr's Minority at Risk database measures the group's spatial distribution. The variable is distributed in four categories indicating whether the group is widely dispersed- value 0- or concentrated in one region -value 3- and whether the group is primarily urban or a minority of the group is concentrated in one region -value 1- or whether the majority of the group is concentrated in one region and the rest is dispersed -value 2. For those cases where the MAR database did not cover the status of the largest group, I have used censuses information¹. However, given the little variation that I had with one of the categories, I have recoded the variable into three new values. Value 1 indicates that the ethnic group is widely dispersed. Value 2 that the group is primarily urban or the minority of the group is concentrated in one region. Finally, value 3 means that the majority of the ethnic group is located in one region. The following table show the association between this variable and the presence of ethnic minorities groups in parliament.

¹ This happened for the Moravians in the Czech Republic.

Table. - 3

Existence of Ethnic Representation in Parliament	Group's spatial distribution			Total
	Widely dispersed	Primarily urban or minority of the group concentrated in one region	Majority in one region, others dispersed	
No Existence	11	0	12	23
Existence	0	7	16	23
Total	11	7	28	
Pearson Chi2	18.5714***			
Cramer's V	0.6354			

*** Significant at $p < 0.01$

In this case the table shows a clear-cut pattern. Those minority ethnic groups that are widely dispersed do not get representation and those groups that are primarily urban or the minority is concentrated in one region do get parliamentary representation. Finally in those cases where the majority of the group is concentrated in one region and the rest is dispersed there is considerable variation. These results seem awkward. It can be reasonable to think that representation does not exist where minorities are dispersed. A key feature of the electoral system is the size of the circumscription or the number of seats that each circumscription have. When the minority is grouped, it is more likely that they will win a seat in their circumscription than if they are not. For this reason it is awkward that there is so much variation in the case of concentration in one region. It is also intriguing the fact that being an urbanite ethnic minority group has a positive effect regarding political representation. In the next section, I will try to measure the impact that key variables of the electoral system have on the issue at stake.

One final point must be made to have a rather clear idea of possible causes that may have an influence in the existence of parliamentary representation for ethnic minority groups. The size of the groups must be taken into consideration in this analysis. The larger the group the more likely it is for it to have parliamentary representation. Putting all variables explained above together with this one, we get the following table.

Table 4

Country	Legal Situation	Geographic concentration	Collective Action	Parliamentary Representation
Albania (3%)*	Opposed to Representation	Majority in one region, others dispersed	No (all elections)	Yes
Bulgaria (8.5%)	Opposed to Representation	Majority in one region, others dispersed	Yes – 1990-91-94 No - 1997	Yes
Czech Rep. **	Recognition but not granting of parliamentary seats	Majority in one region, others dispersed	No (all elections)	Yes – 1990-1992 No – 1996 - 1998
Estonia (28.1%)	Ignorance of minorities	Majority in one region, others dispersed	Yes – 1990-92 No – 1995	No – 1990-92 Yes – 1995-99
Hungary (4%)	Recognition but not granting of parliamentary seats	Widely dispersed	No (all elections)	No
Latvia (30.4%)	Ignorance of minorities	Widely dispersed	Yes – 1990-93 No – 1995- 98	No
Lithuania (8.7%)	Recognition but not granting of parliamentary seats	Widely dispersed	Yes – 1993 No – 1995	No
Macedonia (22.7%)	Ignorance of minorities	Majority in one region, others dispersed	No – 1994-98 Yes – 1998	Yes
Moldova (13.8%)	Ignorance of minorities	Majority in one region, others dispersed	No (all)	No
Poland (1.3%)	Recognition but not granting of parliamentary seats			Yes
Romania (7.1%)	Grant of a parliamentary seat	Primarily urban or minority in one region	Yes (all)	Yes
Russia (3.8%)	Ignorance of minorities	Majority in one region, others dispersed	Yes – 1993 No – 1995	No
Slovakia (10.6%)	Recognition but not granting of parliamentary seats	Concentrated in one region	No (all elections)	Yes
Slovenia (3%)	Grant of a parliamentary seat	Widely dispersed		No
Ukraine (22%)	Ignorance of minorities	Majority in one region	Yes - 1994 No – 1998	No

* It indicates that number in brackets refers to the size of the largest ethnic minority group in the country

** According to last census data, Moravian population varied from 13.22% in 1991 to 3.62% in 2001

This table helps us see something, which I think, is very interesting. It shows how in those countries where a limited number of parliamentary seats is granted, the size of the largest ethnic minority group is small –less than 10%. Furthermore, the legal category “ignorance of minorities” is mainly concentrated in those countries where the size of the largest

minority group is very considerable – with the exception of Russia (3.8%) the size of the largest minority ranges from 13.8% (Moldova) to 30.4% (Latvia). Looking even deeper it can be seen that excepting Estonia's 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections and all parliamentary elections in Macedonia, in none of the remaining countries –Moldova, Latvia, Russia and Ukraine- there has never existed ethnic parliamentary representation. What does explain this counter intuition?

Having seen all these pieces of evidence, I am now in a better position suggest some of the causes behind the existence or not of ethnic parliamentary representation in Central and Eastern Europe. The evidence analysed here suggests at least two things. Firstly, that a more sophisticated analysis is needed in order to determine the type of causal relationship that these variables have with the dependent variable. Secondly, the evidence analysed here also suggests that variables related to the electoral system should be incorporated into the analysis. I will try to develop longer these two different suggestions in the following section of this paper.


III

Electoral systems can be conceived, as Giovanni Sartori points out, as “the most specific manipulative instrument of politics” (Sartori 1968: 273) Politicians are then capable of altering the rules of this institution in order to achieve an specific goal to defend their preferences. Proportionality can be altered by manipulating some of the key features of electoral systems as Lijphart shows in his study about electoral systems and party systems (1994). He shows how effective thresholds are the most powerful tool to influence the degree of proportionality in electoral systems. However, he also demonstrates that thresholds are not the only instrument having an effect on electoral systems. Assembly size, electoral formula, explicit or implied *apparentement* provisions and having or not a presidential form are also important variables that have an influence upon the level of proportionality in an electoral system. Since proportionality affects the way in which minority groups are included in the parliamentary spectrum, this discussion is of paramount importance for the purpose of this research. It is important to see what is the level of proportionality of each country and why they have such levels of proportionality to find out more about ethnic minority representation. Proportional representation systems are more advantageous for minorities than majoritarian systems. PR systems as Lijphart says “has the great additional advantage of enabling any minority, not just those specifically favoured by the electoral law, to be represented (as long as they attain a stipulated minimum level of electoral support)” (Lijphart 1994: 140)

The importance of the effective threshold is also remarked by Taagepera and Shugart (1989) These authors show how higher thresholds limit the presence of political parties in the parliament. The presence of ethnic political parties in parliaments of the countries under study must, then, be influenced by this variable. Having said this, it must be expected that ethnic minority groups are more likely to be represented in parliaments where electoral systems are proportional rather than majoritarian, or where the effective threshold is lower. The electoral formula is also important to see how votes are transformed into seats. Systems that adopt d’Hondt and LR-imperlis systems are expected to have the least proportional results since they will be favouring the larger parties. An intermediate

category is formed by Sainte-League, LR-droop and STV and the most proportional and therefore, the one, favouring smaller parties is LR-Hare (Lijphart 1994; Penadés 2000). Finally the magnitude of the circumscription is also important. The higher the number of seats per magnitude the more likely it will be for minorities to have parliamentary representation.

It must be taken into consideration that these variables not only refers to ethnic minorities political parties but to all small parties that exist in the electoral contest. It is for this reason that my analysis cannot be just limited to the analysis of the impact of these variables. The analysis must include a dimension covering issues specially referred to the ethnic nature of the parties. The diagram below provides a very rough idea of how ethnic parliamentary representation can be achieved. As we can see, there are two ways that lead to the final goal of parliamentary representation. The first one depends exclusively upon the electoral system and the legislation that rules elections. Politicians may have believed valuable for their society to provide minorities with a limited number of seats in the parliament and they have conceived electoral institutions where this characteristic is included. There is a second way for minorities to get parliamentary representation, though. In this case the electoral system is going to be also very important but other elements referring exclusively to ethnic groups will be determinant. I call these elements “Ethnic particularities” and they refer, again roughly, to the variables I have been talking in the previous section: geographical dispersion, collective action and size of the group.



The second type of causal mechanism needs to be proven empirically to see if it holds. For this analysis, I will consider a dichotomic dependent variable. It is the variable that I have also been using in the cross-tabs of the previous section. The variable simply indicates whether there has been ethnic parliamentary representation in every election –value 1 for yes, 0 for no. Given the nature of the dependent variable, I will use a logit regression. The non-linearity nature of this type of regression forces us to do a sophisticated analysis in order to get a clearer idea about how independent variables affect the dependent variable. The regression coefficients will provide us with the direction of the relationship but it will not say anything about the impact upon the dependent variable.

For the analysis, I have two different sets of independent variables. The first one refers to variables from the electoral system. The first one is the legal threshold. This variable refers exclusively to the legal percentage necessary to enter the competition for a seat. It ranks from 0 to 5. The higher the legal threshold the lesser parties will be found in parliament, and therefore the chances for minority parties to exist are smaller than with lower legal thresholds. I will also use a variable which indicates the type of electoral system that each country has had in its parliamentary election. This is a nominal variable where 1 indicates that the country has a smd- single majoritarian district- electoral regime. Value 2 indicates that the country has a mixed regime, and value 3 refers to those elections where PR was adopted. A second variable concerning electoral system is the number of seats in parliament. As Lijphart shows (1994) the number of seats in parliament is an important variable to check the permissivity of the system. The bigger the chamber the more probabilities for minorities to have a seat in it.

The second set of variables refers to those described in the previous section. Geographical distribution of the largest minority is a three categories variable where 1 indicates that the minority is widely dispersed. The second category- value 2- indicates that the minority is primarily urban or a minority of that group is just concentrated in one region and the rest is dispersed. The third category – value 3- refers to those groups which majority is mainly concentrated in just one region. Despite the ordinal nature of this variable, I treat it in the regression as a continuous variable. I assume that the distances between each category are

the same. The second variable of this set correspond to a dummy that measures whether the group has exercised collective action. Information about this variable was provided in the previous section. To measure the level of heterogeneity of each country, I use the proportion of the largest minority group in relation to the total population of the country (minpro) I firstly test the effect of those variables related to the electoral system. The equation that I use to do it is the following:

$$\text{Ethnic Parliamentary Representation} = \beta_0 + \text{minprop } \beta_1 + \text{Seats } \beta_2 + \text{Threshold } \beta_3 + e$$

Table. - 5

<i>Ethnic Parliamentary Representation</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Minpro	-0.0290 (0.0500)	--0.0795* (0.0462)
Seats	0.0026 (0.003)	
Threshold	-0.5125 (0.3995)	-0.2451 (0.4006)
Mixed		18.2107** (1.6977)
PR		19.3008** (1.7199)
Constant	2.5682 (1.8125)	-16.6839
Pseudo R ²	0.0625	0.1806
Observations	41	41

Standard errors in brackets

*** p>0.01 *p>0.10

Model 1 and 2 show the influence of variables related to electoral systems. Model 1 shows very puzzling results. None of the institutional variables are statistically significant. All the variables have the expected sign, though. The model shows how the bigger the parliament the higher the probability to get parliamentary representation. An opposite direction has the legal threshold which also has the expected direction. The higher the legal threshold the lesser the probability to get a seat in parliament. What is intriguing here is the negative sign of the minority proportion. The coefficient tells us that the bigger the size of the group the smaller the chances to get parliamentary representation. Model 2 incorporates the type of electoral system to be found in every election for every country and removes size of

parliament given the scarce influence in the regression. This new model shows results somehow more according to the existing literature. As we can see the more proportional the system is, the more likely it is to get representation. The reference category for this variable is the majoritarian system (SMD). As it can be seen, both mixed systems and proportional representation systems are very significant and have a considerable influence upon the model. These results point out the strength of electoral regimes to explain parliamentary representation. Legal thresholds again have the right direction but they have no statistical significance. A feasible explanation for this lays precisely in the legal nature of this variable. As the literature shows (Lijphart 1994) a more effective measure is the effective threshold as opposed to the legal threshold. The effective threshold is a measure that combines both district magnitudes and legal thresholds. It is defined as the larger of the value computed from the average magnitude and the legal threshold (Lijphart 1994:29)

The second set of independent variables are tested in model 3. In this regression it is shown the effect on ethnic parliamentary representation of those variables related to specific features of the largest minority groups. What the model shows clearly is the importance of geographical distribution. The coefficient shows how more geographical concentration increases the probability of getting a seat in parliament. Curiously, the exercise of collective action is not a significant variable. The variable has the right direction though, and exercising collective action is positively correlated to the dependent variable. The importance of geographical dispersion is shown in the following model. In this regression, I have created a new variable which is the interaction between geographical dispersion and the inverse of minority proportion. Its statistical significance means that taking countries with similar ethnic proportion the geographical dispersion is an important element to understand political representation.

Table.- 6

<i>Ethnic Parliamentary Representation</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Minpro	-0.0777 (0.0496)	
Protest	0.2282 (0.8030)	0.4081 (0.7450)
Concentration	1.1300** (0.5120)	
Interaction minority proportion and concentration		3.0127** (1.4984)
Constant	1.9948 (1.3422)	-1.2019** (0.6107)
Pseudo R ²	0.1834	0.1083
Observations	37	37

Standard errors in brackets

**p>0.05

The final model is given by the following equation:

$$\text{Ethnic Parliamentary Representation} = \beta_0 + \text{Minpro } \beta_1 + \text{Threshold } \beta_2 + \text{Protest } \beta_3 + \text{Concentration } \beta_4 + \text{Regime } \beta_5 + e$$

Table 7

<i>Ethnic Parliamentary Representation</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
Minpro	-0.1767 (2.0967)	-0.1480 (2.8814)
Thresh	-0.1994 (0.9009)	
Protest	1.6012 (1.6349)	1.3129 (1.5598)
Concentration	1.3576* (0.8132)	
Mixed	21.2876*** (4.4185)	20.2677*** (1.7968)
PR	22.3856*** (4.9127)	21.6009*** (2.5209)
Interaction legal threshold and concentration		4.8327* (2.8814)
Constant	-22.3856	-22.3526
Pseudo R ²	0.4321	0.4342
Observations	28	28

Standard errors in brackets

***p>0.01 *p>0.10

Model 5 shows how the two sets of variables interacts in the regression. Again, the most influential variables are those related to the type of electoral system that can be found in the countries under study. Taking the majoritarian electoral system as the reference category, the regression shows how the more proportional the system become the better for minorities to get representation. Legal thresholds show the same direction than in previous models and the same can be said for collective action and minority proportion. Among those variables describing features of minorities geographical concentration is again the most important one. Model 6 shows another interaction between geographical concentration and legal thresholds. It reveals that holding legal thresholds constant, the more concentrated the minority is the higher the probabilities to get a seat in parliament. This final model shows that collective action does have a positive correlation with the dependent variable, in other words, that exercising collective action promotes parliamentary representation. Linking this idea with the fact that geographical dispersion counts, predicted probabilities can be obtained to check the real effect of exercising collective action for gaining representation

Table 8.- Predicted probabilities attending at geographical dispersion and use of collective action

Group's Dispersión	Probability of getting parliamentary representation exercising collective action	Probability of getting parliamentary representation not exercising collective action
Widely Dispersed	0.10	0.02
Primarily Urban or minority of the group concentrated in one region	0.35	0.08
Majority of the group concentrated in one region	0.73	0.25

Table 8 shows that using collective action has a much powerful effect on gaining political representation than not using it. An ethnic group that is concentrated in one region and exercise collective action has a probability of 73% to get a seat in parliament whereas a group that is also concentrated in one region but does not exercise collective action has a probability of 25%.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have surveyed some of the main reasons that might help explain why in some Central and Eastern European countries we find ethnic minority parties in parliament and why in others we do not. I have described two types of mechanisms. One is a direct mechanism and is provided by constitutional provisions. In this sense an ethnic minority group in a country can win a seat in parliament just because it is stated in the constitution to do so. It is an affirmative action measure. But there is other type of mechanism that results from the combination of the design of the electoral system with some key characteristics of the ethnic minority group. Concerning the design of the electoral system I have just considered three variables, namely, the legal threshold, the electoral system and the size of the parliament. Concerning the nature of the ethnic minority group, I have consider its relative size in comparison with the total population of the country, geographical dispersion or concentration and whether they have used collective action.

The data analysed here suggests that the variables having a stronger influence on the dependent variables are the type of electoral system and the degree of geographical dispersion. It seems as if these two variables could provide a feasible and plausible answer for this question. These conclusions are not new, though they are a bit contradictory. The literature has already pointed out that the more proportional an electoral system is, the more inclusive it is. The data here confirms these hypotheses. The literature also remarks that majoritarian electoral system favours concentrated groups. And this idea is also confirmed here. Furthermore, countries such as Ukraine and Moldova have proportional representation electoral systems as well as the largest minority group concentrated in one region and they do not have any seats in parliament for those groups. To these facts, it must also be considered that Ukraine's largest minority group represents 22% of the population and Moldova's largest minority group represents 14%. The explanation provided here does not really bring more light to the issue at stake and further research must be carried out.

An issue that also deserves further research is whether ethnic groups are mobilised or not. Do electoral institutions provide minorities with incentives to mobilise? Are all the groups

equally mobilised? Or, can we find groups that act passively concerning politics and other groups that are more politically active in politics? Do territorial claims have something to do in this political mobilisation? It would also be desirable to expand the analysis within the electoral system and include more variables related to it. The impact of electoral formula, magnitude circumscription and effective thresholds should be incorporated into the analysis. The evidence also suggests to look for other mechanisms. One possible mechanism to explore is whether ethnic minority groups are able to create political parties and the importance of them in the political life of the country. Or whether ethnic minority groups do effectively support ethnic based political parties.

The question remains unanswered and much further research in the topic must be made to find it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bates, R. H., A. Greig, M. Levi, J. Rosenthal, and B. R. Weingast. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Benoit-Rohmer, F., and H. Hardeman. 1994. The Representation of Minorities in the Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. *International Journal on Group Rights*(2): 91-111.
- Benoit, K., and J. Hayden. 2001. "Institutional Change and Persistence: The Origins and Evolution of Poland's Electoral System 1989-2001.". Paper delivered at the 59th. Annual Meeting for the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, April 19-22 2001.
- Blais, A. 1991. The Debate Over Electoral Systems. *International Political Science Review* 12(3): 239-60.
- Blais, A. 1988. The Classification of Electoral Systems. *European Journal of Political Research*(16): 99-110.
- Bogdanor, V. 1990. Founding Elections and Regime Change. *Electoral Studies* 9(4): 288-94.
- Bohrer II, R. E. 1997. Deviations From Proportionality and Survival in New Parliamentary Democracies. *Electoral Studies* 16(2): 217-26.
- Boix, C. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 609-24.
- Cox, G. 1991. SNTV and D'Hondt Are 'Equivalent'. *Electoral Studies* 10(2): 118-32.
- Cox, G. 1999. Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination. *Annual Review of Political Science*(2): 145-61.
- Engstrom, R. L. 1993. Enhancing Factors in At-Large Plurality and Majority Systems: A Reconsideration. *Electoral Studies* 12(4): 385-401.
- Fischer, A. J. 1991. Swings and Gerrymanders. *Electoral Studies* 10(4): 299-312.
- Flores Juberías, C. 1995. The Transformation of Electoral Systems in Eastern Europe and Its Political Consequences. *Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe* 2(1): 5-66.
- Flores Juberías, C. 1999. Minorías Étnicas y Sistemas Electorales en la Europa del Este. *Cuadernos Constitucionales de la Cátedra Fadrique Furió Ceriol*(26/27): 65-96.

- Fry, V., and I. McLean. 1991. A Note on Rose's Proportionality Index. *Electoral Studies* 10(1): 52-9.
- Gaines, B. J. 1997. Where to Count Parties. *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 49-58.
- Gallagher, M. 1991. Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies* 10(1): 33-51.
- Grofman, B. 2001. A Note of Caution in Interpreting the Threshold of Exclusion. *Electoral Studies* 20: 299-303.
- Gurr, R. T. 2000. *Peoples Versus States. Minorities At Risk in the New Century*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Gurr, R. T. 1993. *Minority At Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Holmes, S. 1994. Designing Electoral Regimes. *East European Constitutional Review* 3(2): 39-41.
- Jones Loung, P. 2000. After the Break-Up. Institutional Design in Transitional States. *Comparative Political Studies* 33(5): 563-92.
- Kostadinova, T. 2002. Do Mixed Electoral Systems Matter?: A Cross-National Analysis of Their Effects in Eastern Europe. *Electoral Studies*(21): 23-34.
- Lijphart, A. 1985. The Field of Electoral Systems Research: A Critical Survey. *Electoral Studies* 4(1): 3-14.
- Lijphart, A. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems. A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, A. 1996. The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation. *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 258-68.
- Lijphart, A. 1997. The Difficult Science of Electoral Systems: A Commentary on the Critique by Alberto Penadés. *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 73-7.
- Loloci, K. e. a. 1994. Electoral Law in Eastern Europe. *East European Constitutional Review* 3(2): 42-77.
- Monroe, B. L. 1994. Disproportionality and Malapportionment: Measuring Electoral Inequity. *Electoral Studies* 13(2): 132-49.
- Moser, R. G. 1995. The Impact of the Electoral System on Post-Communist Party Development: The Case of the 1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections. *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 377-98.

- Moser, R. G. 2001. "Ethnic Diversity, Electoral Systems, and the Number of Parties in Post-Communist States.". Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Ordeshook, P. C., and O. V. Shvetsova. 1994. Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties. *American Journal of Political Sciences* 38(1): 100-23.
- Owen, B. 1993. *Political Representation of Minorities: Integration or Segregation*. Warsaw: CSCE: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- Penadés, A. 1997. A Critique of Lijphart's "Electoral Systems and Party Systems". *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 59-71.
- Penadés, A. 2000. *Los Sistemas Electorales De Representación*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales.
- Przeworski, A. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reilly, B. 1997. The Alternative Vote and Ethnic Accommodation: New Evidence From Papua New Guinea. *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 1-11.
- Rogowski, R. 1987. Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions. *International Organisation* 41(2): 202-24.
- Rokkan, S. 1970. *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Process of Development*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo:
- Samuels, D., and R. Snyder. 2001. The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective. *British Journal of Political Sciences* 31: 651-71.
- Sartori, G. 1968. Political Development and Political Engineering. In *Public Policy*, eds. J. D. Montgomery, and A. O. Hirschman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Scott Long, J., and J. Freese. 2001. *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*. College Station, Texas: Stata Press Publication.
- Shvetsova, O. 1999. A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990-1998. *Electoral Studies* (18): 397-409.
- Taagepera, R. 1997. Effective Number of Parties for Incomplete Data. *Electoral Studies* 16(2): 145-51.
- Taagepera, R. 1998a. Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold. *Electoral Studies* 17(4): 292-404.

Taagepera, R. 1998b. How Electoral Systems Matter for Democratization. *Democratization* 5(3): 68-91.

Taagepera, R. 1998c. Nationwide Inclusion and Exclusion Thresholds of Representation. *Electoral Studies* 17(4): 405-17.

Taagepera, R., and M. S. Shugart. 1989. Designing Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies* 8(1): 49-58.

Taagepera, R., and M. S. Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bates, R. H., A. Greig, M. Levi, J. Rosenthal, and B. R. Weingast. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Benoit-Rohmer, F., and H. Hardeman. 1994. The Representation of Minorities in the Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. *International Journal on Group Rights*(2): 91-111.
- Benoit, K., and J. Hayden. 2001. "Institutional Change and Persistence: The Origins and Evolution of Poland's Electoral System 1989-2001.". Paper delivered at the 59th. Annual Meeting for the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, April 19-22 2001.
- Blais, A. 1991. The Debate Over Electoral Systems. *International Political Science Review* 12(3): 239-60.
- Blais, A. 1988. The Classification of Electoral Systems. *European Journal of Political Research*(16): 99-110.
- Bogdanor, V. 1990. Founding Elections and Regime Change. *Electoral Studies* 9(4): 288-94.
- Bohrer II, R. E. 1997. Deviations From Proportionality and Survival in New Parliamentary Democracies. *Electoral Studies* 16(2): 217-26.
- Boix, C. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 609-24.
- Cox, G. 1991. SNTV and D'Hondt Are 'Equivalent'. *Electoral Studies* 10(2): 118-32.
- Cox, G. 1999. Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination. *Annual Review of Political Science*(2): 145-61.
- Engstrom, R. L. 1993. Enhancing Factors in At-Large Plurality and Majority Systems: A Reconsideration. *Electoral Studies* 12(4): 385-401.
- Fischer, A. J. 1991. Swings and Gerrymanders. *Electoral Studies* 10(4): 299-312.
- Flores Juberías, C. 1995. The Transformation of Electoral Systems in Eastern Europe and Its Political Consequences. *Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe* 2(1): 5-66.
- Flores Juberías, C. 1999. Minorías Étnicas y Sistemas Electorales en la Europa del Este. *Cuadernos Constitucionales de la Cátedra Fadrique Furió Ceriol*(26/27): 65-96.

- Fry, V., and I. McLean. 1991. A Note on Rose's Proportionality Index. *Electoral Studies* 10(1): 52-9.
- Gaines, B. J. 1997. Where to Count Parties. *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 49-58.
- Gallagher, M. 1991. Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies* 10(1): 33-51.
- Grofman, B. 2001. A Note of Caution in Interpreting the Threshold of Exclusion. *Electoral Studies* 20: 299-303.
- Gurr, R. T. 2000. *Peoples Versus States. Minorities At Risk in the New Century*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Gurr, R. T. 1993. *Minority At Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Holmes, S. 1994. Designing Electoral Regimes. *East European Constitutional Review* 3(2): 39-41.
- Jones Loung, P. 2000. After the Break-Up. Institutional Design in Transitional States. *Comparative Political Studies* 33(5): 563-92.
- Kostadinova, T. 2002. Do Mixed Electoral Systems Matter?: A Cross-National Analysis of Their Effects in Eastern Europe. *Electoral Studies*(21): 23-34.
- Lijphart, A. 1985. The Field of Electoral Systems Research: A Critical Survey. *Electoral Studies* 4(1): 3-14.
- Lijphart, A. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems. A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, A. 1996. The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation. *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 258-68.
- Lijphart, A. 1997. The Difficult Science of Electoral Systems: A Commentary on the Critique by Alberto Penadés. *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 73-7.
- Loloci, K. e. a. 1994. Electoral Law in Eastern Europe. *East European Constitutional Review* 3(2): 42-77.
- Monroe, B. L. 1994. Disproportionality and Malapportionment: Measuring Electoral Inequity. *Electoral Studies* 13(2): 132-49.
- Moser, R. G. 1995. The Impact of the Electoral System on Post-Communist Party Development: The Case of the 1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections. *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 377-98.

- Moser, R. G. 2001. "Ethnic Diversity, Electoral Systems, and the Number of Parties in Post-Communist States.". Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Ordeshook, P. C., and O. V. Shvetsova. 1994. Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties. *American Journal of Political Sciences* 38(1): 100-23.
- Owen, B. 1993. *Political Representation of Minorities: Integration or Segregation*. Warsaw: CSCE: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- Penadés, A. 1997. A Critique of Lijphart's "Electoral Systems and Party Systems". *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 59-71.
- Penadés, A. 2000. *Los Sistemas Electorales De Representación*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales.
- Przeworski, A. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reilly, B. 1997. The Alternative Vote and Ethnic Accommodation: New Evidence From Papua New Guinea. *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 1-11.
- Rogowski, R. 1987. Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions. *International Organisation* 41(2): 202-24.
- Rokkan, S. 1970. *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Process of Development*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo:
- Samuels, D., and R. Snyder. 2001. The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective. *British Journal of Political Sciences* 31: 651-71.
- Sartori, G. 1968. Political Development and Political Engineering. In *Public Policy*, eds. J. D. Montgomery, and A. O. Hirschman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Scott Long, J., and J. Freese. 2001. *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*. College Station, Texas: Stata Press Publication.
- Shvetsova, O. 1999. A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990-1998. *Electoral Studies* (18): 397-409.
- Taagepera, R. 1997. Effective Number of Parties for Incomplete Data. *Electoral Studies* 16(2): 145-51.
- Taagepera, R. 1998a. Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold. *Electoral Studies* 17(4): 292-404.

Taagepera, R. 1998b. How Electoral Systems Matter for Democratization. *Democratization* 5(3): 68-91.

Taagepera, R. 1998c. Nationwide Inclusion and Exclusion Thresholds of Representation. *Electoral Studies* 17(4): 405-17.

Taagepera, R., and M. S. Shugart. 1989. Designing Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies* 8(1): 49-58.

Taagepera, R., and M. S. Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.