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**Transforming bilateral foreign policy: The impact of EU enlargement on EU members’
assistance to Central and Eastern Europe after 1989**

This article analyses the impact of the EU enlargement process on foreign policy of EU member states along **three intertwined variables** bridging “*the rationalist-constructivist divide*” (J. Checkel): 1) **Interests, preferences, strategies**, 2) **(social) institutions**, 3) **identity norms, ideas and values**. The regulative role of the EU Commission may change the promoted norms – i.e. EU norms progressively replace national ones –, the equilibrium between national actors may also evolve, but core activities still draw on previously established contacts and networks in CEEC and follow the same goals. This study focuses on technical assistance in order to analyse **how national co-operation policies become part of EU common policies**.

Like J. A. Scholte writes in a collective book entitled “the Globalization of World Politics”, “*the challenge for students of politics is to determine how the growth of supraterritorial social space is altering the activities and role of the state in contemporary history*”¹. In this sense, the relationship between European Union (EU)’s Eastern enlargement process and the transformation of bilateral foreign policy² of nation-states located in these regions is an interesting case³. As many studies emphasised the failure of federalist and neo-functional theories to conceptualise regional integration, a new research agenda developed in the 90s around the concepts of regionalisation and Europeanisation processes. But these protean concepts do not make the analysis of Europe’s construction easier, as scholars do not agree on the definition of territorial spaces, interaction or causal links⁴. Projects for example focused on the way national actors represent their interests at the European level, or on the impact of European norms on national institutions of either EU-member states or candidate countries. Nevertheless, little research concentrated on the way the ongoing Eastern enlargement process progressively modifies national (and often long-lasting) policy structures and guiding-norms of EU member states. For this reason, this analysis wants to take distance from the concept of Europeanization and to concentrate only on *the impact of the enlargement process on EU member’s governmental policy to Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC) since 1989*, – more specifically on the relationship between these policies and European assistance to democratisation and transition to market economy⁵.

I believe that ideas are embedded in a historical context and need an institutional support to be effective, and that these ideas and their institutional support can affect the preferences and interests of actors⁶. Therefore, it will be argued that, in order to integrate EU co-operation

¹ SCHOLTE Jan Aart, “The Globalisation of World Politics”, in: BAYLIS John, SMITH Steve (Eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 22. See also ALBERT Mathias, in: JOENNIEMI Pertti (1997), pp. 85-118.

² There is a large literature on *foreign policy*. See for example: HUDSON Valerie M., VORE Christopher S., “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow”, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 39, supp. 2, oct. 1995, pp. 209-238.

³ On dynamic aspects of change in foreign policy, see: GUSTAVSSON Jakob, «How should we study foreign policy change?», *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34 (1), 1999, pp. 73-95.

⁴ See bibliography. The analysis of institutional and normative restructuring processes in the EU is again a prolific research agenda. For a good synthesis on *European integration* and *regionalisation* processes, see Elmar Rieger (1995) and Ruth Zimmeling (1991), but also Joenniemi Pertti (1997), Caporaso (1996), Waever (1996), Zürn (1996). There is more than a dozen definitions of *Europeanisation*. One of the most satisfying is perhaps Radaelli’s one (2000) drawn on a definition of Ladrech. Radaelli proposes to differentiate Europeanisation from other concepts like convergence, harmonization and integration, and to add identities and cognitive components of politics (inspired by Checkel and Schmidt) to R. Ladrech’s definition. As a result, he argues that the concept of Europeanisation refers to: “A set of processes through which the EU political, social and economic dynamics become part of the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (p. 3).

⁵ For a summary of the literature on *policy changes*, see Radaelli (2000).

⁶ GUZZINI Stefano, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations”, *CEU Working Paper IRES*, (99/5), Budapest, Central European University, Dec. 1999, p. 4.

networks⁷, actors of the bilateral assistance had to adapt to the European agenda set during the transition periods of CEEC⁸ – *liberalisation* (demise of authoritarian rule), *democratisation* (transition to democracy) and *consolidation* (institutionalisation of democracy)⁹ – along **three intertwined axes** inspired by P. Hall, A. Hyde-Price and Rittberger (and all)¹⁰ bridging “*the rationalist-constructivist divide*” (J. Checkel)¹¹:

- ***Interests, preferences, strategies***: interest may be defined as an actor’s presumed orientation to maximizing its material (financial means) and intangible (power) resources. While actor’s fundamental interests tend to be constant over time, preferences can change if the context of action changes. This is especially the case if incentives for, or restrictions on, action appear or disappear¹²;
- ***(Social) Institutions***: they may be defined as a permanent and consolidated pattern of behaviour of a specific number of actors in specific recurring situations. The pattern of behaviour are based on a set of rules which define behavioural roles, give meaning to activities and influence actor’s expectations¹³;
- ***Identity norms, ideas and values***: norms may be defined as value-based, shared expectations about appropriate behaviour, which shape actor’s identities and preferences, define collective goals and prescribe or proscribe behaviour¹⁴.

J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (1993) explain that through the intervention of institutions “*the impact of ideas may be prolonged for decades or even generations... [such that they] can*

⁷ On networks, see Robert Castells. ***Policy networks*** refer to an interdependent relationship between political-administrative and private actors, and particularly “*to the collective action of organized, corporate actors, and consequently to interorganizational relations in public policy making*” (Mayntz, 1992, Lehbruch, 1987). See also: Héritier (1993), T. Börzel (1996), Le Gales and Thatcher (1995).

⁸ We could speak of “***communautarisation***” of foreign policy networks, meaning the evolution from national to European sector-related and the building of integrated transnational networks. ***Multilateralisation*** and ***co-operation*** processes draw on a large, mostly neo-liberal literature, describing the building of international organizations. See for example Keohane and Nye (1977), but also for a complete study of international regimes Hasenclever A., Mayer P. and Rittberger V. (1996).

⁹ Bos, 1994; O’Donnell, Schmitter, 1986, Przeworski, 1991. Each phase may be best analysed through different theories: Phase 1, 1988-1994 (system theory), Phase 2, 1995-1998 (actor theory), Phase 3, 1998-2002 (institutionalism).

¹⁰ These three variables are defined by Peter Hall (1997) and Hyde-Price (1999). They can be find again separately in other studies, like those of Volker Rittberger (and all) on the three paradigms of social science, Tübinger Arbeitspapier zur internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, Papers online: <http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/ab2menu.htm>

¹¹ Also M. Zürn, T. Risse, or Jachtenfuchs, Kohler-Koch, R. Mayntz and F. Scharpf. On the interdisciplinary approach of European studies, see the debate between Simon Hix (defending a rationalist, public policy perspective) and Andrew Hurrell and Anand Menon (defending that comparative politics and international relations are complementary) in *West European Politics* (Jan. 1994, April 1996) and the *Journal of European Public Policy* (1998).

¹² Bienen, Freund, Rittberger (n° 33a, 1999), p. 15.

¹³ Zürn (1992), quoted in: Boekle, Rittberger, Wagner (n° 34a, 1999), p. 21.

¹⁴ Rittberger and all (n° 34a, 1999, p. 1) explain that “*two properties of norms serve as criteria for an assessment of their relative strength: the first is the commonality of a norm, i.e. the degree to which it is shared among the units of a social system. The second is the specificity, i.e. the clarity by which a norm discriminates between appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Thus, a norm must have at least a medium level of both commonality and specificity if a constructivist prediction or explanation is to be based on it*”.

have an influence even when no one genuinely believes in them as principled or causal statements”. It is also essential to refer to **social learning** as defined by J. Nye (1987) and P. Haas (1993) in order to link these three variables: “*New understanding of the social and political environment can prompt decision makers to alter their strategies for achieving goals, the latter remaining basically unchanged. Alternatively, new understandings can redefine the very content of the national interest, requiring the selection of new goals and a search for more appropriate strategies to achieve them*”¹⁵.

In this perspective, it may be asked if **socialisation processes**¹⁶ and “*specific bilateral relations*” help “*fostering European integration on a longer prospect*”¹⁷ and thus “*rearrange the relation between society and state*”¹⁸ in the European public space. ***It will be argued that the growing implementation of European projects over national ones draws on bilateral co-operation networks at different (federal and local) levels, and that the nature of these bilateral networks is decisive for the allocation of EU resources. The regulative role of the EU Commission may change the promoted norms – i.e. EU norms progressively replace national ones –, the equilibrium between national actors may also evolve, but core activities still draw on previously established contacts and networks in CEEC and follow the same goals.***

The focus on technical assistance¹⁹ is an interesting case to study ***how national cooperation policies become part of EU common policies***: although its main purpose is often to back up investments and trade activities and to build security through networking, it also consists in education, vocational training and consulting, so in the transfer of know-how and practices to CEEC²⁰ allowing socialization and (mutual) learning processes to take place. As a matter of fact, a great competition emerged since several years between donor states for the transfer of

¹⁵ Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger (1996), p. 208. Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner (1999) also distinguish between societal and transnational socialization processes.

¹⁶ In the enlargement process, one of the greatest competition takes place on the transfer of norms, values and institutional procedures in order to influence actors preferences. As Radaelli (2000) notices, while quoting Jachtenfuchs (1999), « *the analysis of cognitive and normative structure is connected to the renewed interest in sociological institutionalism, preference formation and political legitimacy* ». See also Checkel (1999).

¹⁷ BEDOW Wilfried (von), “Bilateral Beziehungen im Netzwerk regionaler und globaler Interdependenz”, in: KAISER Karl, KRAUSE Joachim (Hrsg.), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Interessen und Strategien*, Band III, DGAP, München, Oldenburg, 1996.

¹⁸ ALBERT Mathias, “Between ‘South of Norden’ and ‘Norden’s South’: Germany and a ‘Baltic political space’”, in: JOENNIEMI Pertti (Ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 85.

¹⁹ The OCDE defines technical co-operation as 1) subventions for education and training activities in the donor or receiver country 2) financing of consultants, audits and similar persons, as well as teachers and administrators sent abroad. OCDE / CAD, *Série des examens en matière de coopération pour le développement. Allemagne*, (29), Paris, OCDE, 1998, p. 85.

²⁰ On transfer and policy transfer, see G. Lehmbruch (1993), W. Seibel (1991), R. Czada, A. Heritier (1991).

norms, values and institutional procedures, as these constitute the framework for confident and long-lasting co-operation networks in a region in the making. On this purpose, and parallel to European negotiations, governments - but also regions / *Länder* - of member states signed bilateral cooperation agreements with candidate states first for security reasons but also in order to defend sector-oriented strategies²¹.

*This research will concentrate on the impact of EU enlargement process on two bilateral assistance policies: the German one, and – not decided yet – the French or the British one. The comparative perspective will also take place on two sectors: assistance on the building of the **Rechtstaat** and on structural (more precisely environmental) policies.* These sectors are places of great competition between EU actors for the imposition of their (national) norms, know-how and practices in CEEC. This article analyses only one case, i.e. the relative impact of the EU enlargement process on the institutionalisation of a German assistance programme to CEEC, and the ongoing integration process of part of the German-CEEC bilateral networks to one EU assistance programme, *Twinning* a programme for institution-building. The analysis will draw along the three intertwined variables mentioned above.

Therefore, the institutionalisation process of the German governmental assistance policy to CEEC will be presented in the first part along the three variables defined above (I), in order to understand in a second part the impact of the EU-enlargement policy on German networks with CEEC on the precise example of law consultancy projects (II).

²¹ Mitterrand's governmental program MICECO created in 1991 took end in 1993 because of rivalries between national ministries and organizations. UK developed a more structured program co-ordinated and implemented by the different sections of its *Know-How Fund*. The Nordic countries, especially Sweden, are also very active and organized on the field of assistance to CEEC.

I – CO-ORDINATING ASSISTANCE TO CEEC: RISE AND FALL OF A GERMAN GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMME

In Germany, the first co-ordination process of financial and institutional governmental consultancy activities in CEEC only appeared in 1992. It was later named “*Transform: advise Central and Eastern Europe for the building of democracy and social market economy – concept and advising programme of the federal government*”²². The co-ordination process of German assistance is the result of a conjunctural situation: as many German ministries developed their own policies towards transformation countries up to 1988, and because of a decline of power of the Kohl Government, budget controls from the federal Audit Office (*Bundesrechnungshof*) and some debates at the *Bundestag*, the Federal Cabinet decided in 1992 to co-ordinating the actions of the federal ministries by implementing a concept named *Transform* programme. What can be drawn from the analysis of the German strategy, the promoted norms and institutional co-ordination of the assistance?

Philanthropic “help for self-help” or a programme serving German trade?

In order to face the multiple challenges resulting from the end of bipolarity²³, the German government adopted an *extensive definition of security*. In an unpublished decision of 1992, the Federal Cabinet identifies three factors of threat and destabilization in CEEC and Newly Independent States (NIS):

- 1) *Political destabilization* (disorganization of the state, risks of civil war, weak belief in democracy);
- 2) *Collapse of society* (strong immigration, especially of the elite having knowledge on weapon and missiles production, but also on nuclear and sanitary questions);
- 3) *Collapse of economics* (recession of production and trade, growing inflation and unemployment)²⁴.

²² (BMWi), *TRANSFORM : Die Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropas beim Aufbau von Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft – Konzept und Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung*, (350), Bonn, BMWi - KfW, 1994. BMWi-Dokumentation. The word *Transform* is a reference to “transformation”, a term used by W. Eucken, one of the founding fathers of social market economy. On transformation, see WAGNER Hans-Jürgen, “La Transformation: un cadre historique et théorique”, *Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest*, 29 (4), déc. 1998. And also in : *Problèmes économiques*, (2638-2639), nov. 1999, pp. 20-24.

²³ In this sense, the implemented strategy draw on J. Nye’s idea of soft power. NYE Joseph S., “Redefining the National Interest”, *Foreign Affairs*, 78 (4), juil.-août 1999, pp. 22-35. On security, see : BIGO Didier, “Sécurité et immigration”, *Cultures et Conflits*, (31-32), aut-hiv. 1998, p. 7-11.

²⁴ KABINETTBESCHLUSS vom 18. März 1992. “Gesamtkonzept zur Beratung beim Aufbau von Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft in den Staaten Mittel-und Osteuropas sowie der GUS”. (not published)

The **German programme Transform** is one of the most important governmental responses to these questions in Europe. Between 1990 and 2000, a total of **2.377 billion DM** was spent for consulting activities as well as other matters, mostly under the label of the programme *Transform*. It mainly consists in education and training of selected partners from 11 countries, which, according to criteria determined by the OECD, are involved in a transformation process²⁵. Between 1993 and 2000, more than 1500 projects were implemented through *Transform* in manifold sectors – economics, politics, agriculture, law, environment, and social matters. In this framework, German ministries strengthened their links to non-governmental organisations and companies²⁶, and especially relied on networks developed during forty years of development policy abroad and on the experience of reunification.

The main idea of the programme is the same as in assistance for third-world countries: “*help the countries to help themselves*” (*Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe*) in their transformation²⁷. It also aims to present **three norms constituting the German post-war identity**²⁸:

- 1) “The model of social market economy characterized first by its open, competitive economy and second by its social security system; (*model of social economy*)
- 2) The experience of reconstruction [after WW II] and of reunification; (*democratisation process*)
- 3) The strengths of a federalist [and pluralist] state structure” (*federalism*)²⁹.

²⁵ They include Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Russia, Ukraine, and since 1998, Slovenia.

²⁶ In its *Journalistenhandbuch*, the BMZ explains it had to develop stronger co-operation with civil society, like through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), in order to cope with nowadays global evolutions. BMZ (2000).

²⁷ The underlying notions are subsidiarity and solidarity. „Help for selfhelp“ was the leading concept of the American Marshall plan in Europe. The idea has been included in the German development policy, as most of the institutions and organisations created for the implementation of the Marshall plan in Germany then became the leading actors of Germany’s aid for third world or development countries.

²⁸ BMZ, *BMZ aktuell, TRANSFORM, Beratung für Mittel- und Osteuropa, Fortschreibung 1999*, Nr. 104, Bonn, BMZ, August 1999, p. 13.

²⁹ It may be noticed that a research project of the European Institute of Florence on the evolution of several EU states identity in the European context also reveals the existence of **the same societal norms in the German case**: “*Any new idea about political order, in order to be considered legitimate, must resonate with core elements of older visions of the political order such as ‘state-centred republicanism’ in France, ‘parliamentary democracy and external sovereignty’ in Great Britain, and ‘federalism, democracy and social market economy’ in Germany*”. MARCUSSEN Martin, RISSE Thomas, ENGELMANN-MARTIN Daniela, KNOPF Hans-Joachim, ROSCHER Klaus, „Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities“, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 (4), Special Issue, 1999, pp. 614-633.

For a comparison, the norms promoted by the G-24 assistance were: “adherence to the rule of Law, respect of human rights, adoption of a multi-party political system, holding of free and fair elections and adoption of a market-oriented economy”. G-24, *Ongoing International Co-operation with the Czech Republic*, meeting and working-documents, 1995.

These norms justify the implementation of *Transform's* consulting activities in following issues³⁰:

- Back up economic policies in order to create the conditions for a social market economy and to establish medium-size companies and other relevant economic structures;
- The restructuring of companies, privatisation and breaking up monopolies;
- The setting up of a fiscal system to include taxes, customs and excises and budgets; establishing the banking, stock market and insurance systems;
- Technical assistance to the agricultural sector;
- Job training and specialised training in business (i.e. management training, vocational training), as well as measures leading to qualifications;
- The law, with an emphasis on economic law;
- Helping both to create and to improve administrative structures;
- Back-up advisory services in labour market policy and social policy, environmental protection, house building and urban development

Although all sectors are linked together, the German programme progressively focused on the third source of destabilization identified in 1992, i.e. **economics (46% of the expertise)**. The other sectors, and especially the social and environmental ones, do only represent a marginal part of the assistance – respectively 4 % and 2% in 1998 (*Annex 3*). As a matter of fact, the government's failure to contain immigration from CEEC and NIS between 1989 and 1994 allowed further assistance to develop co-ordination procedures on economics. Therefore *Transform's* activities mainly help backing up German companies and trade in targeted countries, i.e. regions where the German economy had already developed before 1989. In this context, the social market economy is not only a guide for action, but also a label used by public actors in order to justify two major aims: 1) make German private actors win assistance contracts and influence structural and legal features as well as practices, 2) build long lasting networks drawn on confidence through education and training, and change Germany's image abroad by publicising successful projects in local CEEC newspapers.

Priority for trade activities is also reflected in the ***regional distribution of the assistance***: the major part of the budget and most of the projects concern Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine (*Annex 4*). Some candidate states like Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary do not

³⁰ BMWi, *TRANSFORM : Die Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropas beim Aufbau von Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft – Konzept und Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung*, (350), Bonn, BMWi - KfW, 1994. BMWi-Dokumentation.

beneficiate any more from the German bilateral assistance “*because of their good results*” and the growing place of EU programmes³¹. It is interesting to notice that Bulgaria was replaced in 1998 by Slovenia, a country officially accepted in the first step of EU negotiations. It may be asked if these changes speak for the defence of German national interests, or rather for compliance to EU-decisions and multilateral co-operation perspectives for sharing the burden.

An apparently co-ordinated strategy

While analysing the German assistance policy to CEEC, one may notice the *distortion between official discourses on co-ordination and the ways projects are effectively co-ordinated*. Apparently structured and shaped by public actors, the German programme is in fact mostly implemented by governmental organizations and non-state actors. Only few new institutions emerged after 1989 in Germany for the assistance to CEEC. The institutional networks are a mix of W. Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* institutions based on trade, of development policy organizations and of new structures created after 1989 for the German reunification processes or the assistance to CEEC and NIS, and almost every German ministry and their main (public and private) partners are represented. The mostly sector-oriented networks are made up of experts in federal, regional and local administrations, in health care systems, in NGOs or companies’ foundations, in chambers of commerce, and consulting-companies.... Beside some exceptions, the German assistance in CEE is not really different from the one led in third-world countries since the 70s³². All of these organisations have their own networks of relations, related to other public levels (cities, *Länder*), to companies (services, banks...) and to societal actors (professional associations, academicians...).

The German government adopted an *integrated approach for the co-ordination of the programme*: all the actors officially work together under the leading role of the

³¹ Quoted from interviews at the Ministry of Economics (BMW) and Ministry for Co-operation (BMZ), official co-ordinators of the program, and from annual reports. Behind these official discourses are other reasons: in the Estonian case, German assistance was not required, except on law and privatisation projects. In the Czech case, no governmental agreement could be signed. Many people refer to the bad relations between H. Kohl and Václav Klaus, but also to the veto of Bavarian economic and agricultural lobbies at the *Bundestag*.

³² The main organisations involved in *Transform* have been lasting since the 50s and 70s. The activity of the *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (KfW) and the *Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft* (CDG), set up for the implementation of the Marshall plan in Germany, and the *Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) related to the BMZ, was until now entirely dedicated to the assistance in third-world countries. Other organisations were created more recently for the German reunification (*Treuhandanstalt*) and the assistance to CEEC (*Treuhandanstalt Osteuropa Beratungsgesellschaft mbH* (TOB), IRZ-Stiftung).

Lenkungsausschuss, a *triumvirat* composed by the ministry of Economics (BMW_i), the Foreign Office (AA), and the ministry for Co-operation and Development (BMZ). Until the election of G. Schröder in 1998, former State minister for Agriculture Dr. Walter Kittel (a close friend of Helmut Kohl) was responsible for the general co-ordination³³. A whole structure has been set for the representation of German sectors abroad: the German Bank for Reconstruction (KfW), beneficiating of the main part of the programme's budget, set up 11 local offices (*KOST-Stellen*) in the German embassies of *Transform* countries in order to manage and co-ordinate the various projects. The KfW experts acquired a sort of monopoly on transition matters, using links to economics as well as diplomatic contacts. On many occasions, congresses and seminars were organised in CEEC with other German actors, like political foundations, chambers of commerce (representation offices – AHK – opened in quite all CEEC), trade representation of *Länder* (like Schleswig-Holstein in Estonia or Bavaria in Hungary), etc...

However, ***the co-ordination reflects political rivalries and power relations between German actors***: for the ministries, the control of the *Lenkungsaußschuß* and the dividing up of the annual budget is at stake³⁴, whereas many state agencies and NGOs, who already communicate everyday, believe annual co-ordination meetings in Bonn (since 2001 in Berlin) are a loss of time. Another contradiction lies in the implementation of the program. While Eastern partners officially spontaneously ask for German assistance, the reality shows that ***German companies or state agencies on the contrary, directly contacted most of Eastern partners***. These actors most of the time had already built contacts in CEEC in order to evaluate (or even to create) the needs, and help their partners elaborate a project, to be submitted to German governmental agencies, and then approved by German ministries. Manifold critics opened ways in Germany to controlling procedures and reforms debated at the *Bundestag* especially in 1994-95 and 1998-99³⁵. In this sense, one may not speak of the

³³ After the restructuring of the assistance by the Schröder government, W. Kittel was dismissed. He is now a personal consultant of the Lithuanian government.

³⁴ Elements of path dependency may be noticed on this case: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AA) has only a small influence in the program. Rivalries rather take place between the Ministry of Economy (BMW_i) and the Ministry of economic Co-operation (BMZ), but also the Ministry of Finance (BMF), that receive the main part of the budget. It is interesting to notice that these ministries and their related organisations (KfW...) were represented at the *Ost-Ausschuss* of the Federation of German Industry (DIHT), the main actor of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

³⁵ See debates of the 12. and the 14. voting periods (*Wahlperiode*), particularly the evaluation presented in 1994 by the *Bundesrechnungshof* (German federal Audit Office) at the *Bundestag*: Drucksache 12/8490, Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, pp. 41-44. It revealed that many projects were driven without respecting usual procedures of development policy. Many projects were driven without inviting tenders and by "*unexperienced organisations*". The Office reproaches to the Ministry of Economy (BMW_i) wanting to use the experience of reunification "*although new solutions have to be found for totally different problems existing in Central and Eastern Europe*". The Office also claims for a more control of the federal

instrumentalisation of NGOs or private actors by public actors, as there are processes of mutual influence. The analysis of the societal organisations, agencies, private (companies') foundations, expert organisations or political foundations are in general followed up or partly retaken by administrative organizations³⁶: in this sense, we may call them *places of informal diplomacy*³⁷, although many of these particular activities are often classified under the term of "business of aid" (J. Putzel, 1998).

Another reason explaining the difficulty of a bilateral hierarchical co-ordination is the federal structure of the assistance, which also encourages overlapping actions³⁸; thus German regions (*Länder*) as well as cities (like Hamburg, Bremen, Munich), universities and other public administrations have built their own networks of relations³⁹. Sometimes, solely individuals are the source of these connections between local, federal, and even supra-national levels, as they work for the German Parliament, are part of a local NGO, and/or have contacts at the European Commission. The personal address book of some (political, business...) influent people situated on the intersection of these networks may prove more efficient than a whole organisation⁴⁰.

Talking about socialisation processes

German experts encountered and still encounter many difficulties in the implementation of the assistance. The political colour of the government, and sometimes a clear rejection of German assistance, local culture and traditions represent strong barriers to institutional or know-how transfers, as well as corruption and organised crime do. But as a result of the approach built on partnership, interaction and the making of 'opinion relays' (politicians, administrators,

parliament on these governmental activities (p. 42). It is important to add that controls are rare. Similar discussions took place in 1993-1993 American Congress.

³⁶ Nevertheless, it is not easy to judge what is exactly retaken or not, as some interviews revealed that some analyses are not even read by administrators because of their length.

³⁷ Some scholars wrote about "privatisation" of state's policies (B. Hibou, 1997; T. Brühl, 2001). Béatrice Hibou for example thinks that states adapt to domestic and international constraints by cooperating more and more with semi-public and private actors. As a result of the ever increasing role of transnational actors in political decisions, public actions are more and more focusing on economic matters and integrating economic and financial questions in their discourse.

³⁸ However, the moving of the German government to Berlin somehow contributed to the reshaping of this federal structure: Bonn, where the BMZ and BMA stayed, and the Ruhr-region have turned into an institutionalised pool of expertise and development assistance, whereas Berlin has become the centre of political decisions. A Centre for International Co-operation (CIC) was created on the 1st July 1998 in Bonn, and constitutes the rallying point of federal ministries (BMZ, BMU, BML), about 150 NGOs and German representations of United Nations' organisations.

³⁹ "German foreign policy operates in a dual mode. The government's traditional foreign policy is complemented by Germany's societal foreign policy (*gesellschaftliche Aussenpolitik*). Most of the major German institutions conduct their own foreign relations", in: Peter J. Katzenstein (1997a), p.24-25.

⁴⁰ For example M. Wittman, CDU member of the *Bundestag*, former president of the *Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV)*, is at the same time personally involved in many societal reconstruction projects in CEEC.

professors, heads of companies, journalists...), *socialisation processes, i.e. relations built on confidence and loyalty* (Keck, Sikkink, 1998) developed through everyday contacts, are **a first step to a more integrated Europe**. As a matter of fact, German actors are glad when they notice they participated to change perceptions on values such as freedom, private property, or the respect of the law. They seem particularly satisfied when they managed to keep regular personal contacts with CEEC partners, and see that they are informally called for advice on “*mostly technical and very precise questions, even several months after the end of projects*”⁴¹.

While financial means remained modest and have decreased since 1995⁴², interviews with local actors revealed that the actions of these experts are more important than expected, and that *German experience is appreciated and respected in CEEC*. This may be interpreted as a growing political credit for German actors. Furthermore, many Eastern partners prefer to work in the framework of bilateral assistance, and especially of the German one, because of its flexibility in comparison to EU programmes. As far as the financing is concerned, a progressive and strong responsabilisation of Eastern partners has to be noticed: participants have now to share the costs of training courses journeys and meetings.

Now facing the decrease of national financial resources, organisations of the governmental German assistance to CEEC, like any other EU actors involved in the enlargement process, had to adapt to new European political and institutional procedures created for the implementation of EU assistance programmes in order to keep their position on this particular market and to pursue their activities.

⁴¹ Interviews at the CDG, the IRZ-Stiftung, the KfW and the GTZ, February 2000.

⁴² 300 million DM in 1995, 110 million DM in 2000. There are many explanations for the decreasing of the bilateral financial means: multilateral (EU) financing, co-financing by the receivers and by private actors. (*Annexes 1 and 2*).

II – THE IMPACT OF THE EU’S EASTERN ENLARGEMENT ON GERMAN ASSISTANCE TO CEEC: TOWARDS MULTI-BILATERAL NETWORKS?

Transform was in fact always conceived as a complement to the EU programmes, it was part of the German strategy for a return on investment in the long-term on the contribution to the EU budget: in 1992, the Federal Cabinet justified its policy by writing that “*Germany contributes to 28% of the PHARE budget*”, but “*participates [to its implementation] in an unsatisfactory way*”⁴³. Before asking what kind of institutional and normative adaptations is being observed for the integration to European networks, the German policy has to be linked with the European context.

Making the link between German assistance and European programmes

The way a *European Ostpolitik emerged* is now well known. On the Arch summit in Paris at the end of 1989, the G24 decided to entrust the European Commission with the coordination of the assistance to democracy and integration in market economy. The main European assistance instruments were then initiated: the programmes PHARE for CEEC and TACIS for Newly Independent States (NIS). Trade agreements and later association agreements were signed with every Eastern European states. In 1993, political and economic conditions were defined at the EU summit of Copenhagen⁴⁴ and the first negotiations for adhesion opened in March 1998 with 6 countries and one year later with officially ten candidate states. A planification of EU financial and assistance measures for the years 2000-2006 was signed at the EU Berlin summit in April 1999, opening ways to a stronger integration process, especially on the agricultural (SAPARD programme) and environmental / structural questions (ISPA programme), but also on institution-building projects (*Twinning* programme).

The more EU negotiations with the candidate states evolve, the more the German programme’s regular reports mention international co-operation projects. While the first reports only mentioned German ministerial bilateral actions, activities of other donor countries (especially the USA, Canada, and Japan, UK, France and Sweden) and international

⁴³ Kabinettsbeschluss vom 18. März 1992. « Gesamtkonzept zur Beratung beim Aufbau von Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft in den Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas sowie der GUS ». Not published.

⁴⁴ The adhesion conditions defined in 1993 at Copenhagen are following: 1) stable institutions (guarantee of democracy, rule of law, human right, minority rights) ; 2) functioning market economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressures inside the EC ; 3) ability to adopt the *acquis*; accepted aims of political, economic, and monetary union. (EU Commission, Agenda 2000).

institutions (World Bank, IMF, EBRD), as well as of the German *Länder* were integrated in further reports. Many projects are in fact more and more driven with multiple (national and international) donors. Up to 1995, the annual budget strongly decreased (*Annex 1*): in 1997 it was comparable to the UK's one, and the budget for consulting activities on privatisation represented a sixth of the American bilateral technical assistance on the same matter⁴⁵. *Transform's* budget was also put to the test by the re-orientation of the German assistance to South-Eastern European countries: the German financing to reconstruction and democratisation in the Balkans was in 1999 as high as used to be the *Transform* budget in 1995, i. e. 300 million DM. Thus, ***the governmental programme was restructured***: many ministries lost their budget for their consulting activities, especially those badly represented at the national level or with low legitimacy for driving foreign activities (social questions, environment, Ministry of Internal questions...). Some co-ordination offices of the KfW (*Koordinationsstellen* - KOST) closed (Tallinn, Budapest. Warsaw's KOST will close at the end of 2002), and because many actors had to adapt their strategies to EU tenders procedures, coalitions between different governmental agencies took place in order to lead European PHARE projects in CEEC.

As a result of the changing context, ***German actors first integrated new norms and values into the bilateral programme***: most of *Transform's* projects stopped promoting social market economy and federalism, but the German experience on how to deal with European procedures (representation processes, ways on writing tenders, creation of software for the classification of PHARE tenders...), assistance on the introduction of the European currency (Euro), education on European institutional history, ... The actors also had to adapt to more bureaucratic and competitive procedures and to develop strategies of representation and lobby within the European Commission in order to win tenders. Many civil servants and experts complained that procedures thus became longer and less flexible than in the national one, but like they say, they "*had no choice*"⁴⁶.

The case of the EU Twinning programme is representative of the regulative role of the European Commission for the attribution of projects to actors of EU member states.

⁴⁵ GTZ, 1999, p.10.

⁴⁶ Interview at the IRZ-Stiftung and the Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft, Bonn / Köln, February 2000. Interview at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, department for the EU-negotiations and the co-ordination of European assistance projects, Berlin, February 2001.

Twinning was created in 1997 in order to make available the expertise⁴⁷ of member state practitioners and help administrations of East European countries to implement the *acquis communautaire*. It consists in the long-term secondment (over 12 months) of one or more Pre-Accession Advisors (PAA) from a Ministry or other approved body in a member state to work on a project in the corresponding Ministry in a candidate country⁴⁸. The first year, in 1998, the EU Commission presented 152 projects: the German government made 123 propositions and could participate to 57 of them (under which 33 with the statute of project leader). In comparison, France and the UK, the more active countries in the fields of assistance to CEEC, respectively proposed 81 and 57 projects, but won 40 (F) and 23 (UK) of them. Because of the preponderant position of German actors (they won more than a third of the projects) the EU Commission regulated between 1999 and 2002 the attribution of *Twinning* co-operations in selecting less German projects and more from other EU countries⁴⁹. Nevertheless, German participation to the *Twinning* programme stays very high: a total of 132 *Twinning* projects were lead or implemented by German actors between 1998 and 2000⁵⁰. It is nevertheless interesting to notice that the regional and sector-related repartition of the projects is very different as in the *Transform* programme: it concentrates on CEE countries and especially on sectors which, for the most of them, are now *out* the *Transform* programme. This is the case of Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, and of the activities of the Ministries of Interior (BMI), of Environment (BMU), of Labour and social Questions (BMA), of Health (BMG), etc...and their related organizations⁵¹. Interviews with German civil servants revealed that some actors, for example of the social and environmental sectors which could not face the monopoly of *Transform*'s *triumvirat* – composed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of economic Co-operation – thus found an escape door at the European level in order to keep their consulting activities in CEEC⁵². In this sense,

⁴⁷ The EU Commission has a large and vague definition of expertise: “Given the range of sectors and priorities targeted by the Phare Programme across all the partner countries, there is no typical expert, but there is instead a typical contract for the provision of the expertise needed in each individual case. Expertise is provided by international companies and organisations, European federations, national institutes, universities, consultancies, NGOs and individuals. There is no particular advantage in being large or small, or in having any particular corporate format.” EU Commission (DG1A), *How to work with Phare*, Brussels, May 1999.

⁴⁸ EU Commission, *The Phare Programme. Annual Report 1998*, Brussels, 31.03.2000. COM (2000) 183 final, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Interview at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, department for the EU-negotiations and the co-ordination of European assistance projects, Berlin, February 2001.

⁵⁰ In comparison, France won 104 projects, the UK 75, Spain 59, Sweden 53 and Austria 42. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Meeting of National Contact Points”, *Working-paper on Twinning projects*, Brussels, 24 January 2001. (not published). See also: BMF, „Twinning-Verwaltungspartnerschaft mit den Beitrittsländern Mittel- und Osteuropa“, *Monatsbericht des BMF*, März 2002, pp. 53-56.

⁵¹ EU COMMISSION, “Meeting of National Contact Points”, *op. cit.* BMF, „Twinning-Verwaltungspartnerschaft...“, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁵² Federal Ministry of Finance, interview with a civil servant responsible for the co-ordination of *Transform* and EU programmes, Berlin, February 2001.

*European programmes offered a political opportunity window for actors empowered on the national level*⁵³. It is also important to notice that these projects give way to renewed co-operation between the *Bund* and the *Länder*, particularly the new *Bundesländer*. As a matter of fact, Saxony and Brandenburg obtained the leading role for the implementation of respectively 22 and 17 projects (1998-2000), especially on the fields of agriculture. Mecklemburg-Vorpommern (10), Bavaria (13) and Baden-Württemberg (8), which had by themselves already developed strong bilateral contacts with CEEC, also prove very active⁵⁴. In this sense, it would be interesting to analyse how far the German federal system is restructuring under in context of EU enlargement.

German assistance in the fields of law is also an interesting case of sector-oriented restructuring: the *IRZ-Stiftung*, an organisation created in 1992, is a good example showing how public and private actors have decided to co-operate for the transfer of the *Rechtstaat* and EU related norms.

Consultancy activities in the fields of law:

At the intersection of German and European society

New foreign policy actors or old co-operation paths? – The IRZ foundation (*Stiftung für Internationale Rechtliche Zusammenarbeit*) was created by former Minister of Justice Klaus Kinkel in 1992. In the German law, it is a foundation with private statute, but it represents the principal state agency on which the German Ministry of Justice (BMJ) relies. For K. Kinkel, *the private form is best adapted to nowadays co-operations*: it is flexible, it has access to private resources and its legitimacy is more important than public actors' one⁵⁵. The IRZ, as a mandated organization, is free to elaborate, select and implement assistance projects in CEEC and to establish its own contact networks abroad. Its only obligation towards the BMJ is to hand out an annual report on its activity, which is most of the time not read by ministerial civil servants⁵⁶. The directorate and the list of members include manifold juridical (professional federations of jurists, lawyers, attorneys...) and economic actors (under which

⁵³ The concept of opportunity window is a public policy concept. See also: NENTWICH Michael, "Opportunity Structures for Citizens' Participation : The Case of the European Union", *European Integration Online Papers (EioP)*, (1), 1996. <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1996-001a.htm>

⁵⁴ Mecklemburg-Vorpommern for example opened a Representation Office („*sort of regional embassy*“, interview at the Office in April 2000) in Tallinn (Estonia), Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg did the same in Hungary. BMF, *Monatsbericht des BMF*, März 2002, p. 55.

⁵⁵ KINKEL Klaus, "Juristischer Know-How Transfer in die Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropa", *WiRO*, Heft 1, 1992, pp. 2-4.

⁵⁶ Interview at the German Ministry of Justice, 13 february 2001.

the federation of German industries, DIHT⁵⁷), but also researchers and university professors⁵⁸. The IRZ particularly signed a co-operation contract with the Institute for East Law (*Institut für Ostrecht*, IfO) located in Munich, a research centre specialised in analysis and consulting on East-European law. The IfO was created in the 20s and rebuilt in the 60s. It organises since 1966 pan-European congresses of jurists (*Münchener Ost-West-Rechtstagung*) facilitating contacts between jurists, attorneys or judges “at a time (...) when a juridical East-West comparison was considered as absurd”⁵⁹. Nevertheless, after 1989, an important part of German assistance activities on the fields of law now draw on these already existing contacts.

The IRZ aims to promote the German Rechtsstaat in sending short and long time experts to ministries and other institutions in CEEC. It organises training and conferences for the presentation of German law, mostly on subjects related to trade and economy, but also travels for CEE jurists to Germany in order to show them the functioning of German justice institutions (Constitutional Court, regional courts...). It particularly helps in the fields of constitutional and trade law for the elaboration of constitutional articles. The German commercial and civil codes served as model for the juridical restructuring of many CEEC (Hungary, Estonia, ...). Nevertheless, even if one may speak of the transfer of hard norms⁶⁰ to Eastern Europe, practices and interpretations of CEEC partners strongly keep on drawing on traditions and habits inherited from soviet time⁶¹.

The growing place of European norms and institutions – Interviews⁶² and official annual reports (1994-1999) reveal that there is a clear change after 1995-96 in the structure of the IRZ for the development of transnational networks in Europe and contacts with international organisations. The foundation first increasingly includes actors from the private sector having international resources, i.e. German corporate actors, non-governmental organisations, university professors, jurists, attorneys or bank directors, but also actors from other EU member states (judicial associations, like the Dutch *Centre for international Co-operation* in Leyden, or the French *Association pour le renouveau et la promotion des échanges juridiques*

⁵⁷ The DIHT, and especially its East council / Ostausschuß lead by Otto Wolff von Amerongen, was one of the most important actors of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. See: AMERONGEN Otto Wolff (von), *Der Weg nach Osten. Vierzig Jahre Brückenbau für die deutsche Wirtschaft*, München, Knaur, 1992.

⁵⁸ For a detailed list of members and activities, see the annual report and the regular publications of the IRZ in the professional magazine *Wirtschaft und Recht in Osteuropa* (WiRO).

⁵⁹ Site internet de l'*Institut für Ostrecht*.

⁶⁰ On the transfer of norms, see G. Lehbruch (1993), W. Seibel (1991), R. Czada, A. Heritier (1991).

⁶¹ Interviews at the Estonian Ministry of Justice, April 2000. See also TASA Mihkel, « Nie fertig : das Rechtssystem Estlands ist wie seine Hauptstadt », *Estonia*, Heft 1, 14. Jhgg, 1999, pp. 3-12 and several articles in WiRO (1992-2002).

⁶² Interview with the chair executive of IRZ-Stiftung and with the person responsible for developing projects in the Baltic States, Bonn, February 2000.

avec l'Europe centrale et orientale (ARPEJE) in Paris) and from international organizations (OECD, BERD...). These networks aim at the organisation of seminars on international and EU related issues for CEE partners, mostly with the help of EU financing. ***The coalitions built since a few year between different public and private actors in order to stay competitive and to win European projects is now transforming the infra-national co-operation procedures:*** in 1998, the IRZ signed a contract with the Society for technical co-operation (GTZ) related to the Ministry of economic Co-operation (BMZ), which name and experience serve as caution in the writing of tenders. It means that the GTZ officially presents the dossiers at the EU, and the IRZ implements the projects in regard of its expertise on CEEC law systems. Around 10% of all *Twinning* projects lead by German experts between 1998 and 2001 were driven in the field of law, and 24 projects on Justice and home affairs⁶³. Most of them draw on co-operations built in the framework of *Transform*.

Annual reports reveals that **the IRZ strongly modified the content of its activities up to 1998:** seminars and visits of CEEC jurists in Germany now mainly focus on EU relevant topics⁶⁴. As a matter of fact, the experience presented at conferences and formations is not a national one any more, but a European one, or more precisely, a national European related one. German jurists have to explain how German law adapted to European norms, how institutions evolved, etc... The content of the assistance is strongly oriented on the transmission of the *acquis communautaire*, and the legal preparation for the Euro. In this sense, European procedures, norms and institutions progressively replace the specific German norm of the *Rechtstaat*.

As the demand for assistance in the fields of European legislation particularly increased since the opening of negotiations in March 1998, ***the IRZ now helps with the implementation of PHARE and TACIS projects.*** Most of *Transform* experts, who first used to work for the implementation of German projects, now exhibit PHARE (or *Twinning*, ISPA, SAPARD, depending on their) and TACIS boards on their office doors. Interviewed in 2000, the director of the IRZ had in fact more to say on European (*Twinning*) projects, than on bilateral German ones. But he stressed that the very bureaucratic European programmes, their long-time of preparation (at least 6 months), and the multiplied number of working partners did not prove

⁶³ EU COMMISSION, BMF, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ For exhaustive details on German consulting activities in the fields of law in CEEC, see annual reports (1992-2002) and particularly the professional revue of the *Institut für Ostrecht "Wirtschaft und Recht in Osteuropa"* (1992-2002) containing regular descriptions of the IRZ activities.

efficient, whereas *Transform* was flexible and helped developing co-operations and personal contacts of better quality⁶⁵. These contacts still last and now help for candidatures to EU tenders.

It is also interesting to notice *the role played by historical tradition and mutual experiences for the building or rebuilding of bilateral contacts*⁶⁶. The Baltic States, and particularly Estonia, for example mainly asked for German assistance in the field of law. The assistance on commercial and civil law was particularly important: German trade and civil codes were taken over at 80%⁶⁷. Estonian civil servants of the Ministry of Justice explained that the government decided to establish again the former Estonian laws elaborated a century ago under the Bismarckian period in order to have a quick transition to Western standards. Other type of co-operation may be drawn on similar lines: the city twinning between Kiel and Tallinn for example was of crucial role in the building of the Estonian chamber of commerce. One may ask if the 1988 call for a *New Hansa*⁶⁸ also speaks for the revival of old and sometimes forgotten identities and solidarities...

Finally, it may be noticed that *Transform's idea men and women do not perceive the German assistance policy to CEEC as efficient as wanted it to be*⁶⁹. As a matter of fact, many actors of the governmental assistance see their actions as a failure, like for example in Estonia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It would be interesting to analyse if these "failures" are reflected in the bilateral activity of other actors like regions (*Länder*), cities and private actors like professional groups, companies and NGOs, and to understand how far the contextualisation of bilateral relations, and especially the absence of mutual identity norms and/or economic interests, may explain the failures of inter-national and then European co-operation activities.

⁶⁵ Interview at the IRZ-Stiftung, Feb. 2000, Bonn.

⁶⁶ On this point, reference may be made to theories of path-dependency or historical institutionalism.

⁶⁷ The French professor Bertrand Badie explains that the expansion of occidental law "before answering political strategies, reflects the necessity of organising and codifying economic exchange relations, might they be private or public". We believe that the expansion of European laws and social norms mainly respond to the same needs. Bertrand Badie (1992).

⁶⁸ With the beginning of *Perestroika* former Schleswig-Holstein's minister president Björn Engholm was the first to speak of a the revival of a New Hansa. Some analysts interpreted this call as a political strategy aiming to integrate the economy of one of the poorest German Land at that time in the growing Baltic sub-regional process.

⁶⁹ This came out of about a third of the around 30 interviews made in Germany.

**General conclusion:
questioning foreign policy in a regionalization process**

Through this study, it was possible to analyse the relative impact of the European Eastern enlargement process on the strategies, the institutions and the identity norms and values promoted by German actors to the assistance to CEEC. It was also possible to notice the evolution of actors' socialisation and configurations depending on the moving context of enlargement, and the transition from what used to be a (in this case German) bilateral foreign policy and to EU common policies. It could be noticed that the growing implementation of European projects over national ones, although strongly regulated by the EU Commission, still establish on bilateral co-operation networks at different (federal and local) levels, and that the nature of these bilateral networks is decisive for the allocation of EU resources. The promoted norms change (EU norms replace national ones), the equilibrium between national actors evolves, but assistance's core activities still draw on previously established contacts in CEEC. They above all follow the founding goal of transferring know-how and practices in order to build security through long-lasting networks with Eastern and Central Europe.

As a conclusion, the growing importance of subsidiarity and of new logics of legitimisation has to be noticed in expanding pan-European co-operations. The EU enlargement process increases the possibilities of political participation for actors with low legitimacy and power at the national level. On the European level, the EU Commission plays the role of the arbitrator on the allocation of resources and the restructuring of transnational networks. Therefore, the decline and fragmentation of national foreign policy and *the increasing EU competitive environment would force actors to build national, sometimes European coalitions* in order to pursue their activities and to go around the monolithic institutions of nation-state unable to reform. This study particularly focused on administrative actors and their related organisations, but it would have been possible to adopt the perspective of other public (*Länder*, cities, universities...) and of private actors (religious organisations, companies' foundations, etc...) working with CEEC in order to understand other parts of the fragmentation of external policies. Research at the crossroads of international relations, European policies and sociology still need to be done in order to understand how the nation-state, and particularly its external policy, is questioned by an EU regionalisation process in the making.

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Annexes:**Annex 1**

Official budget of Germany's assistance to CEEC and NIS between 1990 and 2000 (Million DM):

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Budget	112	212,5	299,4	300	300	300	285	178	150	130	110	90	70

Source : BMWi, *Fünf Jahre TRANSFORM, Beratung für Mittel- und Osteuropa, Bilanz und Ausblick*, Bonn, BMWi, KfW, Juni 1998.
+ Entretiens BMWi, BMZ, BMF.

Annex 2

Break down year by year of the EU PHARE funds committed in the period 1990-1998 (EUR million):

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Budget	493	758,9	996,2	998,4	966,9	1 153,3	1 222,5	1 147,7	1 153,9

Source: EU Commission, *The Phare Programme. Annual Report 1998*, Brussels, 31.03.2000. COM (2000) 183 final, p. 21.

Annex 3

Sectoral distribution of <i>Transform's</i> annual budget (1998)	In %
Commercial sector	46 %
Training and qualifications	12 %
Financial sector	9 %
Consulting on governmental and law activities	8 %
Agricultural sector	7 %
Research	7 %
Administrative institution building	5 %
Labour, social, health	4 %
Environment	2 %

Source : BMWi, *Die Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropas beim Aufbau von Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft. Konzept und Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung, Fortschreibung 1998*, (439), mai 1998, Bonn, BMWi. BMWi Dokumentation, p. 23.

Annex 4

Regional repartition of *Transform's* annual budget (1997) :

Russia : 26%	Czech Republic : 3%
Ukraine : 11%	Slovakia : 4%
Bielorussia : 5%	Estonia : 3%
Poland : 9%	Latvia : 3%
Hungary : 6%	Lithuania : 3%
Bulgaria : 6%	Other : 21%

Source : BMWi, *Fünf Jahre TRANSFORM, Beratung für Mittel- und Osteuropa, Bilanz und Ausblick*, Bonn, BMWi, KfW, Juni 1998.